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THE 



STATESMANSHIP OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 



As Seen in liis 



Public Career prior to 1861 



BY 



ANDREW ESTREM 



,^.s.s^K..---;^^Sr 



FOR THE DEGREE OF 




PRIVATE EDITION 

1S93 



«v 



fl343 



THE 



STATESMANSHIP OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 



As Seen in his Public Career prior to 1861 



BY 



ANDREW ESTREM 



A THESIS SUBMITTED A T CORNELL UNIVERSITY FOR THE DECREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 



PRIVATE EDITION 
1893 






Printed by Lutheran Publishing House. Decorah. Iowa. 



PREFATORY NOTE. 



This brief study pretends to be neither a biography nor a 
history', but, in a measure, a combination of both. Such being 
the plan, the characfler of the execution must depend partly on 
the manner in which the necessary limitations have been ob- 
served. A somewhat close adherence to the title of the paper 
has made necessary the omission of much biographical detail 
that would have revealed some of Seward's traits in a most 
attracflive light, — such as the gentleness of his domestic life, the 
strength of his personal friendships, his integrity, his religious 
temperament. These things are best learnt, however, through 
his letters as they appear in the biography written by his son, 
Frederick W. Seward. From a biographical point of view, it is 
evidently unsatisfacftory to stop short in the account at the point 
at which the person under consideration entered upon what many 
will deem the most important part of his public career. But 
considered with reference to historic unity, such a proceeding 
stands, in this case, in need of no apology. 

Acknowledgments are due to Professor Moses Coit Tyler, 
in whose historical seminary this paper was prepared. 

A. E. 
Cresco, Iowa, July 21, 1892. 






Cornell Uuiv. Lib, BxcUang 

MAR J3 4»0*« 



/ 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER 1. 
EARLY POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS ..... I 

CHAPTKll II. 
IN THE NEW YORK SENATE ...... 8 

CHAPTER 111. 
FIRST WHIG GOVERNOR OF NEW Y'ORK . . . -14 

CHAPTER IV. 

FIRST WHIG GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK (Con.) . . 25 

CHAPTER V. 
EARLY ANTI-SLAVERY IDEAS . . . . . -32 

CHAPTER VI. 
IN THE COMPROMISE CONGRESS OF 1850 . . . 41 

CHAPTER VII. 
DEFENDS THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE . . . -51 

CHAPTER VIII. 
PLE.'VDS FOR THE STATE OF KANSAS .... 59 

t'HAPTKR IX. 
IN POLITICS, 1855-60 ....... 67 

CHAPTER X. 
IN THE L.VST CONGRESS BEFORE THE W..\R ... 73 



LIST OF AUTHORITIES ....... 85 

INDEX .......... 87 



THE STATESMANSHIP OF WILLIAM H, SEWARD. 



CHAPTER I. 

EARLY POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS. 

Near the close of the first quarter of this century, New 
York pohtics presented the spectacle of nominally one part}- 
with three or four more or less antagonistic subdivisions. In 
federal politics this was the "era of good feeling," but this 
feeling had evidently not taken possession of the New York 
politicians. Here the Bucktail facftion fought against the Clin- 
tonian with all the bitterness of partisan warfare. Between 
these stood the remnant of the Federal party, no longer keep- 
ing up an independent organization, but still strong in the 
character of its chief men. The origin of the quarrel between 
the Clintonian and Bucktail branches of the Republican party 
dated from De Witt Clinton's election as governor in 1S17. 
As the proje(fi:or and chief advocate of the Erie canal, he en- 
countered the opposition of manj- who thought his scheme 
extravagant and impracticable, and of many more, in the 
southern parts of the state, who regarded it as of onh" local 
importance. The opposition was led by Tammany Hall men, 
some of whom wore, on certain occasions, an ornament which 
secured for the opponents of Clinton the name the}- bore. Promi- 
nent among the Bucktails were such men as Daniel D. Tomp- 
kins, then vice-president, William L. Marcy, and Martin Van 
Buren. The latter was their acknowledged leader, though per- 
sonally he was not opposed to the canal scheme. In a year or 
two, when Clinton's projedl had gained more approval, the 
Bucktails ceased their opposition to it altogether, but their 
hostility to Clinton was as bitter as ever. Nor need this occa- 
sion surprise. New York politics have always had in them 
something that baffles ordinary explanation. So far as one can 



Z WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

ascertain, the opposition was now continued on a personal basis. 
Clinton was accused of attempting to form about himself a per- 
sonal party and of being in secret alliance with the Federalists. 
In 1819, it was thought a sufficiently .serious charge to accuse 
him of favoring the re-ele(5tion to the United States senate of 
the Federalist Rufus King. But the next year Van Buren and 
his friends came out strongly in favor of King's election.' 

In general ability, and especially in political shrewdness, 
the Bucktail party was superior to the Clintonian. Clinton him- 
self, though able and patriotic, was somewhat cold in demeanor 
and liable to over-confidence. He had always been the child 
of power and a di.stributer of patronage. When some of his 
opponents proposed a convention to revise the constitution of the 
state, and among other things to abolish the obnoxious coun- 
cil of appointment, he at first opposed the plan, wishing to 
retain the council. The Bucktail party, having perceived the 
drift of public opinion, made efforts to have a convention called 
while they had the power to control it. In this they were 
successful. When the convention met in 1821, they had the 
greater number of delegates, among them Van Buren, who on 
this occasion did some of his most meritorious work. The 
councils of appointment and revision were abolished, the suffrage 
was extended, and man}- offices formerly appointive were made 
eledlive. When the new constitution went into effedl in 1822, 
Clinton retired from office and his party praeflically dissolved. 
But a circumstance occurred in the beginning of 1824 which 
again brought him prominently before the people. By an ill- 
advised scheme of his opponents in the legislature, he was re- 
moved from the office of canal commissioner, which he had 
long filled with conspicuous ability. This aroused the indig- 
nation of the people, and he was again brought forward as a 
candidate for governor in 1824. The presidential question, 
complicated by the prominent appearance of four candidates — 
Adams, Jackson, Crawford, and Clay — was now distracting New 
York politicians, and a new party, the People's party — organ- 
ized for the occasion and disappearing with it — came forward 
to add further diversity to the scene. 

Such in brief was the political situation in New York when 

' llaninioiid, Hisl. nf I'nl. I'nrtUa in X. 1'.. i. .514-.51(;. 



EARLY POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS. 6 

William Henry Seward began to take an aeftive interest in 
public affairs. He was now a pradlicing young lawyer in 
Auburn, having been admitted to the bar in 1S22. His early 
education had been obtained in Orange county, on the Hud- 
son, where his father, an ardent believer in Jeffersonian demo- 
cracy, had held several positions of public trust. Seward's 
college life had been spent at Union college, then under the 
presidency of Dr. Eliphalet Nott, distinguished as an educator, 
an inventor, and a divine. In him Seward had in his subse- 
quent career always a valued adviser and friend. Although 
adopting the legal profession, Seward had early conceived a 
liking for questions of a political nature. His home training 
had tended to make him an admirer of Daniel D. Tompkins 
and an opponent of Clinton's scheme of internal improvements, 
but in the elec~tion of 1824 he cast his vote for De Witt Clinton 
and John Quincy Adams. This change was due to the matur- 
ing of his ideas respedting public policy. He thought that what 
the country now needed was "a policy which .should strengthen 
its foundations, increase its numbers, develop its resources, and 
extend its dominion."' This statement may be regarded as 
the keynote of most of his subs^quent endeavors. He saw the 
Republican party, both in state and nation, assume an attitude 
of hostility or indifference to internal improvements, and further, 
that it had its chief strength in the slaveholding states.- He 
therefore became an earnest supporter of the national adminis- 
tration of Adams and of the now forming National Republican 
party, whose chief spokesman was Henry Clay. In the state 
he lent his aid to the building up of the new organization 
around the nucleus of the Clintonian party, but the task was 
not an easy one. Although Clinton was elected in 1S24, and 
again in 1S26, the party was losing ground, partly because per- 
sonal and local differences were scattering its forces, partly 
because the opposition was conducted with greater skill. 

Up to this time, such political acflivity as Seward had put 
forth had been of little more than local significance. But in 
the year 1826 occurred an event which in the course of the 
next few years was to bring a new element of confusion into 
the politics of New York, and to a less extent also into national 

' Seward. AiilnUhKinqih]!. .")4. - //)/''. 



4 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

politics. This event was the abdu(5lion of one William Morgan, 
of Batavia, New York, tlirough the influence of freemasons, 
for his attempt to publish a book disclosing the secrets of their 
order. Morgan was never more seen, and as indi\idiial guilt 
could not be established, and as masonic influence seemed to 
be at work hampering the investigation, the masonic order was 
charged with his murder. The abdudlion of Morgan produced 
a strong feeling of excitement throughout western New York, 
soon extending itself also to other states, especially Pennsyl- 
vania, Massachusetts, and Vermont. To vindicate the majesty 
of the law as against certain criminals was at first the only 
objeifl of the movement, but as is generally the case with moral 
impulses when sufficiently intensified, this idea soon sought a 
political embodiment. Secret .societies were presently declared 
incompatible with the spirit of a free government, and it was 
agreed to vote against all candidates who were known to be 
freemasons. Onlj' by force of circumstances did this programme 
later expand so as to embrace general principles of government. ' 
In New York state the Anti-masonic party found such sup- 
porters as William H. Seward, Thurlow Weed, Francis Granger, 
and Millard Fillmore ; elsewhere it gained the favor and the 
support of such men as John Quincy Adams, Richard Rush, 
William Wirt, and Thaddeus Stevens. Its first prominent 
appearance in politics was in i<S2S, when it presented a state 
ticket to the voters of New York. Seward had from the outset 
sympathized with the objecft of the movement, but, like some 
of his similarly disposed party associates, he at first showed 
unwillingness to bring the matter into politics,'-^ and advised 
his Anti-masonic friends to remain in the National Republican 
part}' in order to effect, if possible, the re-election of Adams.'' 
Seward at this time acted, in local conventions, as a kind of 
mediator between the two parties, with a view to secure co- 
operation between them. But the plan did not work smoothly, 
more especially because the Anti-masons, in their strong devo- 
tion to one idea, wanted no candidates but their own. ■* Yet of 
the two chief parties they opposed the Jackson party the more, 
because its leader was known to be a prominent mason. 

' Hammond, ii. 38.5, ^92. - Weed, Aiitiililii(inii>h]i, i. 300. 
' Seward, Autiiliiii(iiiii>)i}i. Tl. ■• Haniiiioiul, ii. :!87. 



EARLY POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS. O 

After the eledlions of 1S28, which made Jackson president 
and Van Buren governor of New York, Seward began to take 
a leading part in the organization of Anti-masonry. He 
was present in county and state conventions, was a delegate 
to the national Anti-masonic convention of 1830, at Philadel- 
phia, and to the Baltimore convention of 1S31, bj^ which William 
Wirt was nominated for president. The new party had now 
become, in some localities, the chief opposition to Jackson. 
Some hopes were entertained that the National Republicans 
would endorse Wirt as their candidate in 1832. But they would 
have none other than Clay, and Claj', though willing to have 
support from Anti-masons, declined to pose as their candidate. 
He thought the masonic question had nothing to do with poli- 
tics. ' In the national eledtion of 1832, the Anti-masons suffered 
a decisive defeat — receiving the ele<5toral votes of no state but 
Vermont. This marked the pradlical collapse of the party. In 
some of the states they had enjoyed, and still continued to 
enjoy, some successes. Such was the case in New York, where 
thej- sent many members to the legislature. It was by this 
party that Seward, in 1S30, was elected to his first office, that 
of state senator. 

The question may arise. Why was it that Seward, who had 
alread}' given evidence of political talent, chose to identify him- 
self with a party whose essential objedt was so politicall5^ insuffi- 
cient, and so politically imprac5ticable, as the abolition of a 
secret .society? What at the outset influenced him more espe- 
cialh- was, no doubt, his strong native sense of justice and 
regard for political equality, and the convidlion that justice had 
been thwarted and political equality put in danger by the 
machinations of a secret oath-bound organization.'- To this 
consideration must be added the fadt of his residence near the 
center of the agitation, the intensity of which could not help 
affeefting him in some degree. Another circumstance, of a 
similar nature, may be alluded to. Thurlow Weed, at this 
time a journalist in Rochester and soon afterward in Albanj', 
became one of the most zealous advocates of the new move- 
ment. Between him and Seward a close personal and political 

' Clay, iri/iA.s-, iv. :J04. ^ Cf. resolutious presented liy Seward, in Pro- 
ceedinfjs «/ I'. S. Aiili-iiiiis<iiiic ('(nii'cnt'Kni. ls:jo. S4. 



6 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

friendship had begun to grow up — a fa<5l that may have had 
some influence in causing young Seward to embark in the 
Anti-masonic craft. As to the party considerations involved, 
Seward .speaks himself in his autobiography written at a later 
date: After the elections of 1828, he considered the National 
Republican party pradlically in ruins, and while he could not 
trust the Jackson- Van Buren party, he recognized the Anti- 
masons as representing principles and policy, state and national, 
similar to his own. '■ That the National Republican party was 
declining in power, is true enough, although it still was chief 
in opposition to the Jackson administration also in New York. 
But that the Anti-masons, as a party, represented any principles 
beyond their first-born, can scarcely be said of them prior to 
their seeking a national organization in 1830.- 

It is curious, in this connection, to notice what opinions 
Seward expressed at the time in regard to the prospects of 
Anti-masonry. In the Philadelphia convention of 1830, as 
chairman of the committee to report on the then existing state 
of the movement in the United States, he gave it as his opin- 
ion that the day was not distant when New York would add to 
the glory achieved by her great works of internal improvement, 
that of emancipation from the thraldom of secret societies.* 
In a speech made on the same occasion he held that the oppo- 
sition to secret societies sprang from the people, and that "the 
question mu.st be met and decided."'' In 1831, while a member 
of the state senate, he asserted, in speaking of the issue between 
Masonry and Anti-masonry, that, if there were intelligence 
among the people to see the dangers which threatened their 
liberty, there could be no doubt of the result of such a contest.^ 
But after the ele<5tions of 1832 and 1833 he admitted, as did 
the Anti-masons generally, that they had failed in their chief 
objects, and that their cau.se could not succeed politically. 

If Seward's attaching him.self to this party was a political 
mistake, the mistake consisted in his failure, at the time, 
to distinguish between the transient and the permanent in 
politics. In this case he showed more of the eagerness of 
the reformer than of the forecast of the politician. Neverthe-- 

' Autobi<}()r<ip)iij, 74. - Hainmuml, ii. 39(3. ^ PinnaJiinix, etc., 70. 
* Ibid. 131-23. 5 Seward, Workx, iii. 348. 



EARLY POLITICAL AKKILIATIONS. / 

less, Seward was by nature well equipped for the work of 
political leadership. He was a firm believer in party govern- 
ment, and held that in a free state there could never be more 
than two permanent parties, with one or the other of which a 
citizen, once his choice was made, would necessarily act. With 
him party allegiance was a strong sentiment, at times perhaps 
too strong, yet not really prejudicial to independence of judg- 
ment. It is a singular fact, chara<fteristic both of the times 
and of the man, that while he adted with no less than four 
political parties during his life, they were in each case parties 
which he had largely helped to organize. Nor need this imply 
inconsistency on his part ; in some respects it was rather the 
parties that were inconsistent. What gave Seward his main 
influence as a party leader was his evident sincerity and lofti- 
ness of purpose. As a political speaker he had not the advan- 
tage of an imposing figure and a powerful voice, but he had 
a pleasing manner and an earnestness that sprang from strong 
convi(5tions. His speeches appealed to the judgment, and seldom 
were of the impassioned type. Ambitious he no doubt was, as 
he himself admits, but his was no narrow ambition that seeks 
mere immediate ends. With the Van Buren school of politi- 
cians he had little sympathy, for while he had an eye for 
party expediency, the bent of his mind disinclined him to their 
methods as his conception of the public interest carried him 
beyond their ends. His political opponents he arraigned unspar- 
ingly, but without personal bitterness. To him it was enough 
to condemn measures and policies of which he disapproved. 
For the same reason he hardly ever chose to defend himself 
against personal attacks. He looked to the future for the vindi- 
cation of his conduct, and therefore accepted political defeats, 
of which he had his share, with philosophical calmness. His 
bearing under such circumstances was in a measure due to an 
optimistic temperament and to an easy self-confidence. 

But Seward was more than a politician, more than a 
manager of party ; in the mercenary sen.se, he never was this. 
It was by services in the higher sphere of statesmanship that 
he established his fame. What the character of those services 
was, will appear from a survey of his official career, which took 
its beginning with his entrance on legislative life at Alban}-. 



CHAPTER II. 

IN THE NEW YORK -SENATE. 

When in January, 1831, Seward took his seat as one of 
the thirty-two senators of the Empire state, he was twenty-nine 
3-ears of age, but his slender form and light complexion made 
him look younger. A contemporary writer thinks his elecftion, 
though so young, due to two causes — his great personal popu- 
larity, and the improbabilitj' that a person nominated by the 
Anti-masons would be eledted. ^ But he was not the only one 
so eledted. There were six other Anti-masons in the senate, 
while in the lower house the number at present was thirty,'^ 
among them being Millard Fillmore, who likewise began his 
political career in the service of that first of our moral-idea 
parties. Of Seward's party associates in the senate the more 
prominent were Albert H. Tracy, who had served three terms 
in congress, and William H. Maynard, whom Seward describes 
as a man of unusually good parts. These three seem to have 
divided among themselves the leadership of their little band. 
The large majority of both branches of the legislature were 
Jacksonian democrats, or, as they were called by their opponents, 
"regencj- men," the affairs of the party being largely guided 
bj^ the so-called "Albany regency." Against this body of 
managers Seward directed much of his early facility in political 
arraignment. By his party associates he was generally assigned 
the work of writing the annual address of the minority of the 
legislature to the people, a practice then in vogue. As party 
■documents these addresses are not perhaps much above the 
average in general cliaradter, but always unexceptionable in 
style. At times Seward would charge too much against the 
"regency."- Thus, in a political speech of 1824, ■' he asserted 

' Ilaiimioud, ii. 34'2. - Cf. AiildliiiKimiihii. 80. ^ irr</'A-.v. iii. .33.5. 



IX THE NEW YORK SENATE. V 

that the men who later constituted the "regenc)'" were, in the 
convention of 1S21, defeated in their efforts to retain the old 
council of appointment, whereas the facfls show that the com- 
mittee on appointments, of which Van Buren was chairman, 
submitted a report in favor of its abolition, which report was 
unanimously adopted.' It may, perhaps, be called Seward's 
good fortune that he began his career in a minority party. 
This early called out his resources in debate and helped to 
prepare him for that work of parliamentary opposition in which 
he was later to take so prominent a part. 

His first recorded speech in the senate was one on the 
militia system, which he wished to see continued and reformed. 
It was a sensible, but not an elaborate effort, nor was the sub- 
jedl one of pressing importance. But it served to introduce 
the man to his new surroundings, and enable him to overcome 
his original embarrassment, which he pleasantly describes in 
his letters. Another of his early speeches, which reveals more 
of his political tendencies, was one on the ele<5lion of mayor in 
New York city. Before 1821 the mayor had been appointed 
by the council of appointment, since then bj' the common 
council of the city, but a recent change in the charter necessi- 
tated a different mode of appointment. Various methods being 
proposed, among others that of vesting the appointment in the 
legislature, Seward offered an amendment that the mayor be 
eleifted by the people. This, he thought, would be the safest 
plan and the one most in keeping with the work of decentral- 
ization of power begun in the constitutional convention of 1821. 
The tendency of all our principles of government, he said, is to 
democracy. - 

His chief speech in the state senate was one delivered in 
1834, called forth by the political and financial conditions of 
the time, conditions of a national rather than of a state char- 
adler. 

President Jackson's hostility to the United States bank had 
shown itself as early as 1829, but it was not until his imperi- 
ous nature was incited to battle by the plans of his opponents 
that this hostility became a passion. While Jackson as well 
as Clay had convi(5lions on the subjecft, both were willing to 

1 Priin'ciliiiijs iif the Vunnt. C(ini\ of /«/. -iW. 2 ll'nrfcs. i. 10-1.3. 



10 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

make the question serve, if possible, a political turn. Although 
the bank charter would not expire until 1836, the bank applied 
to congress for a renewal in the earh^ part of 1832. Its cause 
was espoused by the anti-Jackson men, who, knowing that a 
majority favorable to a recharter could be secured in congress, 
pressed the matter with the evident view of embarrassing Jack- 
son and dividing his party in the coming election. But Jackson 
was not embarrassed. He vetoed their bill, gained the elecflion, 
and decided to have the deposits removed. As his secretary 
of the treasurj' would not perform the act of removal he was 
displaced by one who would. After October i, 1833, no more 
deposits being made in the bank, its loans were largely cur- 
tailed. This caused great business depression and consequent 
excitement throughout the country. When congress met in 
December, the removal became the subject of prolonged and 
trenchant criticism. Against this act was directed the search- 
light and thunder of the highest oratorj^ of the senate. On 
December 26, Clay made an elaborate speech, the main point 
of which was, that the president had exceeded his constitu- 
tional authority in ordering the removal. 

A question of this character could not fail to arrest the 
attention of the state governments. Representatives in congress 
were favored with instructions to condemn or sanction the pro- 
ceeding. In the New York legislature resolutions in support 
of the president's policy were introduced bj- the ruling part}-. 
When they came under consideration in the senate, Seward, in 
a speech of January' 10, 1834, opposed them with much spirit 
and ability. As a piece of good debating this speech will com- 
pare favorably, at some points, with some of the speeches made 
on the same subject in congress. It is characterized by breadth 
of view and by picturesqueness of style. Speaking of the minute 
approval proposed of every step taken by the president in the 
bank controversy, Seward declared the resolution in question 
derogatory to the dignity of the legislature and prompted only 
by a servile attachment to Jackson. "And now," said he, "who 
is this Andrew Jackson that 'we must bend our knees if he 
but look on us?' " "Is he greater than the father of our 
country?" Yet Washington would have spurned the legislature 
of a free state that should have laid such resolutions at his 



IN THE XP:\V YORK SENATE. 11 

feet. The president's course could not be excused on the 
ground of extreme necessity, as congress had declared the 
deposits safe six months before, and would meet again in sixty 
days. As for a national bank, he deemed such an institution 
necessary to maintain a sound currency. But he should favor 
the renewal of the old charter only in case a limitation were 
put on the power to establish branches, and in case the capital 
of the bank were to be taxed equivalently to that of state 
banks. The removal of the deposits, in the manner effected, 
he characterized as unconstitutional. The treasurj' department 
was designated by the law creating it as a "department" only, 
while the other departments were called "executive." From 
the very nature of the constitution the treasury could not be 
an executive department. The revenues were under the manage- 
ment of congress : for convenience it had delegated part of its 
duty, but it could not constitutionally delegate this power to 
the executive. Discretion to remove the deposits was given to 
the secretar}' of the treasury, not to the president. The latter 
had usurped the discretion and duties of the former. The power 
of removal was not sufficient to justify the proceeding. If it 
were, the president might, on his own responsibility, exercise 
all executive functions and make himself a despot. ^ 

The main point of this contention — that the secretary of 
the treasury was the virtual agent of congress — had been elabor- 
ated bj' Clay in his speech of December 26,'^ alread}- alluded 
to. Nor does Seward hesitate to avow his indebtedness. ^ The 
point, however, is not a tenable one. Though some difference 
evidently exists between the relation which the treasury and 
the other administrative departments sustain to congress, still 
the fact remains that they occupy the same relation to the presi- 
dent, who may appoint and remove the secretaries for reasons 
which to him seem sufficient, and who exercises a general super- 
vision over the whole executive department. But this super- 
vision does not imph' absolute control, for as to duties assigned 
to heads of departments by law, they are judicially responsible, 
the president's control extending only to matters within his 
legal and constitutional discretion. * As the supervision of the 

' Il'o/Ti'.v. i. 18-27. 2 Clay, Wniks. v. .598. '■> Aiit(jl/i<t(ji<iii)iij. 1.51. 
* Cf. ilarbury rx. Madison. 1 CraiK-li, t:i7. 



12 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

deposits was b\- law vested in the secretar)- of the treasury, 
the president could not personally assume the responsibility for 
their removal. This he did not do in the final act, and, there- 
fore, whatever may be thought of his proceeding otherwise, he 
was technically within the law. 

In April, 1834, Seward had occasion to speak again on 
this general question, but with special reference to the effects 
of the removal of the deposits on New York. Governor Marcy 
had recommended a loan of $6,000,000 of stock to aid the 
business interests of the state in overcoming the present depres- 
sion. When a bill to this effect was brought before the senate, 
Seward opposed it as offering an inadequate remedj-, and as tend- 
ing to mere party advantage. He defended the course pursued 
by the United States bank, and gave it as his opinion that, as 
the removal of the deposits was the cause of the depression, 
the only effectual relief would be their restoration. This he 
prayed the legislature to advise. But it is improbable that such 
a step at this time, e\'en if it had been politically possible, 
would have proved effective. 

Of Seward's other work in the senate during his four 
year's term, there seems to be but scant record. From the 
journals of the senate it appears that he generally voted in 
favor of new commercial, banking, and railroad corporations, 
and of canals. In regard to railways his theory was, according 
to a later statement, that thej' were "simply public highways — 
to be constructed exclusively for the public welfare by the 
authority of the state, and subject to its immediate diredlion, 
as the canals of the state had heen," but in this theory he had, 
he admits, "no following in any quarter."' He voted against 
raising the quite moderate salaries of the judges of the supreme 
court,- but spoke in favor of the abolition of imprisonment for 
debt, and in favor of various prison reforms. As to instruct- 
ing members of congress, he thought this practice prejudicial 
to those states whose members were not instructed. All states 
had the same right to instruct: "vSuppose all to exercise it, 
where would be the freedom, and what the value of debate?"-* 

When the nullification documents of South Carolina came 
before the senate, Seward as well as his colleagues voted with 

' Alltiiliiiniidiiliii. '.(4. - Sen. Jiiinifil. /■s'.V.V, 31(i. " \\'(jr],f. i. Hi. 



IN THE NEW YORK SENATE. 13 

the majority in approval of Jackson's conrse and in condemnation 
of nullification as unauthorized by the constitution. But im- 
mediately afterward he introduced in succession three resolu- 
tions whose necessity at the time is not easily recognized. The 
first two declared, in substance, that congress ought to be 
governed by a strict construdlion of the powers of the national 
government, the third affirmed that the president, in his procla- 
mation, had advanced the true principles upon which alone the 
constitution could be maintained and defended.' In remarks 
he made on the last resolution, he declared its purpose to have 
been a distincft endorsement of the principles announced by the 
president, whereas the former approval was in more general 
terms. ' If this explanation be admitted as sufficient, the present 
pertinence of the first two resolutions — pointing as the}- did in 
the opposite direction — is still unexplained, unless it be assumed 
that in this series of resolutions Seward wished to express his 
regard for both state and national rights. But after all, he was 
not a strict constructionist. The attitude towards national 
questions which he had already assumed will have indicated as 
much. Though as a state executive he will sometimes be found 
inclined to a .strict construction of federal powers, the general 
tendency of his political ideas was strongly national. He had, 
through political affinity, inherited many of the principles of 
the old Federalists, but in the modified fonn in which they 
appeared in the political character of John Quincy Adams. 

From the foregoing account of his senatorial work, it is 
seen what was the early bent and scope of Seward's mind — a 
regard for the rights of the people, liberal views regarding 
governmental action, and a prevailing tendency to consider 
questions of national policy. It is for its suggestiveness rather 
than for its actual results that this work merits attention. It 
also helped to give Seward a prominence in the state which 
favored his promotion, a few years later, to a higher post. 

' Srii. .Iininiiil. ;,s'.;.7. l.-),S-l.=i!). 2 Uhtijia jilnj. i. ii'S. 



CHAPTER III. 

FIRST WHIG GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK. 

When Seward entered the legislature in 1831, he was a 
member of a hopeful and aggressive minority party, but when 
his services terminated in i8j^4, his party had, as we have 
noticed, practically disappeared. Its natural alh' in opposition 
to Jackson, the National Republican party, though still active, 
had also lost much of what coherence it had possessed. It had 
offended the South by its tariffs, roused distrust among the 
poorer classes by its espousing the cause of the "monster" 
bank, and diminished its force by minor internal dissentions. 
The Democrats, too, had been to some extent divided by Jack- 
son's removal of the deposits and by his vigorous treatment of 
the South Carolina difficulty. Out of these various elements — 
prostrated Anti-masons, weakened National Republicans, and 
disaffected Democrats — arose the Whig party. Much the larger 
proportion of its members was contributed by the National 
Republicans, whose principles came to be the ruling ones at 
least in the northern branch of the new organization, but of 
these principles opposition to the party in power seems in 
practice to have been chief It was in the spring of 1834 that 
the name Whig was first suggested as a party designation for 
all who opposed the Jackson administration, the name being 
intended to signify popular opposition to the "personal rule" 
of Jackson. One of the first successes of the party was gained 
in New York city. ' 

It was but natural that Seward should attach himself to 
this party ; to him it was in the main only a return to his 
party associations prior to 1830. For the Whig party was, 
after all, largely a continuation of the National Republican. 

' liiiiijidiihu. \.-S-\7: Xil(f' Ixdiistir. \lvi. ll."i. 



FIRST WHIG GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK. 15 

With characteristic energy' he aided in its organization in the 
state of New York and was already in 1834 nominated as its 
candidate for governor. A contemporary historian writes that 
"Seward, though a young man, had by this time acquired so 
high a reputation for his talents and political tact that . . . 
his seledlion as the Whig gubernatorial candidate was a matter 
of general consent."' But the Democratic press complained of 
him that he was an unknown man with "red hair, and a long 
nose." In the Whig campaign of this year appeared already 
some of the devices which later came to play such a part in 
that party's tadlics. Liberty poles were raised, the opposition 
were called "Tories," and their national chief "King Andrew."- 
But the Whigs were defeated. 

Seward now resumed his legal profession, meanwhile retain- 
ing his interest in politics, and making several political and 
literary addresses. This was a time when the building of 
railways and the extension of the canal sj-stem were leading 
topics of interest in the state. As was usual with him, Sew- 
ard favored such enterprises and thought the general go\ern- 
nient had acled unwiseh- in abandoning the polic}' of internal 
improvement. He held that the legislature owed "a paternal 
care in this respecft" to everj' region of the state.'' 

After the Whig vicftory in New York in 1837, in part due 
to the financial panic of that year, Seward began again to be 
prominently mentioned as the strongest Whig candidate for 
governor. He was nominated in 1838, and was elected bj- about 
10,000 majority over governor Marcy, who was for the fourth 
time a candidate. This was the first time since the retirement 
of John Jay, in iSoi, that the Democratic party of New York 
did not, in one or the other of its branches, eledl the state 
executive. As in the previous }'ear, the assembly had also a 
Whig majority-. On January i, 1839, Seward entered on another 
period of service at Albany, a service fraught with all the diffi- 
culties incident to the position of chief representative of a new 
party in power. 

The four j^ears of his governorship were filled with events 
and controversies of perhaps more than usual importance in 
state annals. But in the case of many of them, the importance 

' Ilaiiimdiitl, ii. 44-;. -' fiior,/((/j)ii/. i. 23T--24«. ■' Wurhs. iii. 319. 



16 WII.IJAM H. SEWARD. 

was naturally one that was confined to that day and genera- 
tion. Of the subje(fls discussed by Seward in his annual 
messages, no one received so much attention as that of internal 
improvements. The project of enlarging the Erie canal had 
been entered upon in 1835; besides, several lateral canals had 
been decided on and begun. But in 1839 it was discovered 
that the expenses of the proposed works would be twice as 
large as had been provided for in the original estimates. This 
discovery, together with the local and political opposition which 
the canal policy had so often encountered, produced a strong 
disposition, in many quarters, to discontinue the public works. 
Against this Seward repeatedly advised, in view both of the 
immediate and the remote consequences. He recommended the 
legislature to push forward the work with moderation and 
econom^^ To abandon the system would have injurious effects, 
because "the industry of the citizen," he observes, "has been 
stimulated, and the wages of labor, the prices of the products 
of the earth, and the value of property, have been sustained 
bj' expenditures in the prosecution of this sj'stem."^ But it 
was not on such temporary considerations that he based his 
main argument. He held that the principle of internal improve- 
ment rested on the obligation of the state to develop its re- 
sources and to promote the general prosperity, '^ and that the 
carrying out of this principle would encourage immigration and 
the settlement of new lands, augment national wealth, promote 
commerce, favor diffusion of knowledge, and strengthen the 
bonds of the Union.'* As to the means necessarj- for this pur- 
pose, he would not resort to taxation, but depend on the exist- 
ing or anticipated revenues of the canals, and make these the 
basis of any loans that might be authorized.* He referred 
approvingly to a report made in the assembly of 1839, in which 
it was maintained that the productiveness of the canals would 
warrant the state in expending $4,000,000 annualh' for ten years 
in public improvements. But while favoring liberal state ex- 
penditure in this direction, he contended that "all appropria- 
tions for purposes of internal improvement ought to be made 
with a view and constant purpose to call into co-operation 
individual capital and enterprise." = Still, where other agencies 

Mfur?,.s. ii. 335. -///(•(/. I'.IS. -^ ll,id.-U2. ^Ihhl.-V^S. " IIii(1.20i.20o. 



FIRST Wmc; GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK. 17 

were not forthcoming the state should undertake the work. 
That all parts of the state might enjoj- equal benefits, he urged 
the granting of aid to railroads where canals were impractica- 
ble. ' Of railroads that received legislative aid duriug these 
years, the New York and Erie was the most important. 

To facilitate the work of internal improvement, Seward 
repeatedly urged the legislature to express recommendations to 
congress that the proceeds of the public lands be distributed 
among the states. This was good Whig doctrine, and it seemed 
the more plausible now that many of the states were in great 
financial straits, the after-effecfts of the crisis of 1837 and of 
excessive expenditures in public improvements. Seward regarded 
such distribution as just and expedient — it would help the states 
to continue their works of improvement, and would tend to 
check the preponderance of the federal government ; for he 
held that the power of the national executive had, during recent 
years, been unduly increased, to the detriment of the necessary 
independence of the states. -' Speaking of the benefits the states 
would derive from the proposed distribution, he said New York 
was now "obliged to pradlice a cold and calculating charity." 
With this revenue schools, almshouses, and prisons would be 
ampl}- provided for. Taxation would be lightened. "Wlio can 
obje<5t to a measure which would secure a very general exemp- 
tion from the burdens of government?"'' On November 5, 1841, 
he wrote a letter to J. C. Spencer, then secretary of war in 
Tyler's cabinet, but previously secretary of state of New York, 
in which he suggested that the federal government, in view of 
the financial embarrassments of the states, should come to 
their relief by purchasing the perpetual right to use the state 
thoroughfares. Such aid to the states he considered both right 
and just ; the Union and the states had the same interests, and 
the state debts had generally been incurred in promoting im- 
provements and education, which constitute foundations of 
national prosperity. The power to grant such relief he based 
on the responsibilities of the federal government in regard to 
post-roads and the national defense, the state thoroughfares 
being indispensable to the discharge of these responsibilities.* 

This suggestion, as well as the recommendation in regard 

' W'orl.s. ii. ■>ST. -• Ibid. -i-'H. '■' Ibid, -iil-i. ' Ibiil. r,IIS-IU)!l. 



18 WII.I.IA.M H. SKWARD. 

to the land proceeds, came to naught. But the legislature 
made liberal appropriations for internal improvements, for the 
interest in this subject was not confined to the chief executive. 
It was a time of bold enterprise and high expectations regard- 
ing the future of the state. In 1842, however, when the finan- 
cial pressure in the state became greatest, its debt amounting 
to more than twenty-three millions of dollars, ' a law was passed 
indefinite!}' suspending all the works of internal improvement. 
This meaisure originated with the Democrats in the legislature, 
who now had large majorities in both branches. Seward felt 
constrained, in view of the financial urgency and the decided 
stand taken by the legislature, to give his assent to the measure.'^ 
But in a subsequent message he recommended the rescinding 
of the law. It was not until several years later, however, that 
the prosecution of the public works was resumed. 

We now know that the Erie canal enlargement, as well as 
some of the lateral canals, proved to be beneficial and profit- 
able enterprises in the end, especially to the last generation. 
But it seems plain that .Seward pushed the matter with too 
much devotion to the future benefits of the policy, without 
sufficiently reckoning with the financial and political situation 
of the time. The fact that the work was suspended during his 
incumbency tends to confirm this opinion. Furthermore, it is 
evident from the manner in which he advocated this policy 
that he held to a somewhat paternal theory of government ; 
not that he lacked faith in the progress and in the self sustain- 
ing capacity of the people, but he considered it the duty of 
the state to seek, by generous efforts, to quicken their progress, 
and more particularly to give them the means of becoming 
good citizens. 

This leads to the consideration of another subject, which 
became the occasion of much political contention during Sew- 
ard's administration, namely the public school question. The 
question of religious instruction in the common schools had 
begun to be a subject of discussion in 1838. John A. Dix, as 
secretary of state — the schools being then under the charge of 
that official — had advocated such instruction based on the Bible 
without note or comment.'' But the question soon assumed 

' Nilcs' Rci/r. Ixiii. :^T4. - lliid. Ixii. sii. ■' Roberts. y<-ir Varh. ii. .'i.W-.ifi. 



I'IKST WHIC; COVKRXOR OF NEW VOKK. 19 

\'arious other forms and became a perplexing one for several 
3-ears. The Catholics, more especially those of New York cit3', 
felt prejudiced against the public schools as then administered 
and declined to make use of their advantages. As a result, 
thousands of the children of poor Catholic parents were grow- 
ing up in ignorance.' The problem, as it presented itself to 
Seward's mind, was, how to make the public school system 
reach these classes, in the interest of good citizenship. In liis 
annual message of 1840, he stated his position in the following 
manner: "The children of foreigners . . . are too often deprived 
of the advantages of our system of public education, in con- 
sequence of prejudices arising from difference of language or 
religion. It ought never to be forgotten that the public wel- 
fare is as deeph" concerned in their education as in that of 
our own children. I do not hesitate, therefore, to recommend 
the establishment of schools in which they may be instructed 
by teachers speaking the same language with themselves and 
professing the same faith."- Elsewhere he expressed the belief 
that "no system of education could answer the ends of a 
republic but one which secures the education of all,"-' and that 
"knowledge taught by any sect is better than ignorance."' 

The position taken by Seward on this question gave rise 
to much opposition. He was denounced not only by political 
opponents but by members of his own party. He was said to 
have recommended a division of the school funds between 
Catholics and Protestants, and was charged with a design to 
subvert the .school system and undermine the Protestant re- 
ligion. He was "sapping the foundations of liberty," and was 
"in league with the Pope." Many honest people who cared 
little about politics were alarmed lest the work of the Pilgrim 
fathers was to be undone. ■' The popularity of the governor 
was diminished in consequence, his re-election in 1S40 being by 
a largely reduced majority, caused chiefly by his attitude on 
the school question. 

At this opposition Seward was surprised, having supposed 
this to be a policy in which all j(epublican and Christian citi- 
zens would concur. '' He remarked that he had not recom- 

' I!isliii|i lliislif^. iri.);,.v. i. T!l, -' Wtirlin. ii. --il.i. ' liUajiiiiihii. i. .50-i. 
■* ir<,;7r.s-. iii. 4S(|. ■■> I'f. niaiirdiiliii. i. 4(1:;. « IhUl. M)->. 



20 WII.LIAJI H. SEWARD. 

mended, nor did he seek, "the education of any class in for- 
eign languages, or in particular creeds," but observed, at the 
same time, that he indulged no apprehensions from the influ- 
ence of any language or creed among an enlightened people.' 
He looked to "the great ends of the equal dissemination of 
knowledge, and the consequent improvement of societv," and 
felt confident that his views would prevail in due time, in spite 
of prejudice. - 

While this controversy was clouding the political horizon, 
especially from the Whig point of view, the Catholics of New 
York city, under the leadership of Bishop Hughes, were mak- 
ing efforts to secure their share of the school fund. Thej- 
applied to the common council and subsequently to the legis- 
lature, praying for redress. Bishop Hughes delivered a large 
number of addresses on this question during 1.S40-41, in which 
he held that the school laws, as then administered, required a 
violation of their rights of conscience; that the schools were 
either irreligious or sectarian in the interest of Protestantism ; 
and that the Catholics were reduced to the alternative of main- 
taining separate schools, in which case there was double tax- 
ation, or of suffering their children to go without an education.^ 
Meanwhile, J. C. Spencer, secretary of state, submitted a report 
wherein he admitted the justice of some of the complaints made 
against the Public School Society. He made it appear that the 
number of children not attending the public schools was more 
than twice as large in the city of New- York as in all the re- 
mainder of the state, and recommended, in effect, that the 
district .system prevailing elsewhere in the state be introduced 
into the city.' 

In his annual message of 1S42, Seward based his recom- 
mendations on this report, holding that the magnitude of the 
evil had not till then been fully known, nor its causes suffi- 
ciently understood. What had been supposed to be due to indi- 
vidual and occasional prejudices was discovered to be due to a 
permanent conscientious distrust of the education given in the 
public schools. This distrust was deepened by reason of the 
subversion of precious civil rights. The Public School Society 

' Works, ii. 281). - Ibid. iii. 4sn. 4S2. •' Hii;^'lies. U'orl.s, i. 41, (( sty. 
* HUiilfiiiihyi. i. 58.5-.5:!{i. 



FIRST WHIG (;()\-KRN()K OI" XI'.W YORK. 21 

was too much of an independent corporation, and, whatever 
the merits of its management, it had failed to gain broad con- 
fidence. He submitted, therefore, tlie expediency of vesting the 
control of the schools in a board of commissioners eletfted by 
the people, which board was to have charge of the school 
moneys. One of the questions involved, he observed, was 
whether parents had a right to be heard concerning the instruc- 
tion and instrudlors of their children.' 

In behalf of the existing sj-stem it was urged, on the other 
hand, that the great body of citizens approved of it and de- 
sired no change, that the Public School Society was not a pri- 
vate corporation, its accounts being submitted to the legislature, 
and membership being open to all citizens who chose to pay 
a small amount ; and furthermore, that in but few counties of 
the state was the condition of education better than in the city 
of New York.- 

The legislative outcome of the controver.sy was the passage 
of an adl in 1842 carrying out the suggestion as to a board of 
commissioners, and making the sj'stems of the city and the 
rest of the state more nearlj- correspond. The measure was 
introduced and carried through the legislature by the Van Buren 
party, the Whigs lending it apparenth- no support.-' 

The adoption of this measure can not be said 'to have car- 
ried out to the full the original intentions of Seward. What 
those intentions were, as regards pracflical policy, is by no means 
unmistaktably clear. His general purpose is sufficiently obvi- 
ous. He desired to broaden the influence of education. But 
he evidently felt some concession to be necessary if those who 
considered themselves aggrieved in conscience were to be reached 
by the educational system of the state. That their grievance 
was well founded he neither asserted nor attempted to prove 
— to exclude for a moment the argument as to the school 
societj'. The concession was therefore to be, so far as the 
Catholics were concerned, an adl of magnanimit.v. B3' the estab- 
lishment of schools in which instrutflion might be made espe- 
cially agreeable by reason of the language and faith of the in- 
strucflors, it is most natural to suppo.se that he meant the em- 

' iro/7..v. ii. :l(l6-:j0'.l. - (\f. synopsis nf oomiiiissioners' rciunt. .V. 1'. 
TrilHiiK'. Sci)t. IS. 1S41. 3 yilcK' HnjiKUi: Ixii. 113. 



22 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

ployment by the state of schools in which such instruction was 
already provided. This once done, however, it is difficult to 
see how the line of distindlion between public aid to secular 
and to religious education could be maintained. In .so far, 
therefore, as his school policy will bear this interpretation, it 
properl}' failed of legislative approval. 

The proposition to change the school management in New 
York city was a less radical one, and seems to have had no 
essential connecftion with the foregoing recommendation, except 
in so far as, favoring a more popular control, it tended to meet 
.some of the objedtions urged. That the Catholics expecfled some 
relief from this proposition, is shown by the facfl that the}- 
favored the school bill of 1842.^ Still, their favorite plan, as 
we have seen, was of a different scope. Although Seward 
exchanged views with Bishop Hughes on the school question, - 
the assertion that he acted under Catholic influence is without 
proof Whatever one may think of the advisability of his 
cour.se, one cannot help commending the courage and personal 
disinterestedness with w-hich he maintained it. 

The discussion of the school question naturall}- brought 
up the question as to foreigners. The Whig party, as in a 
sense a continuation of the old Federal part}', had never pos- 
sessed, in a large measure, the confidence of the foreign ele- 
ment. But this was due to acftual conditions quite as much 
as to past tradition. Relative to banks, tariffs and similar 
issues, the Whigs had, as a matter of choice or of party ne- 
cessity, assumed the side of the well-to-do classes. This made 
them appear less friendly to the poorer classes of foreign de- 
scent. The membership of the part}- being thus somewhat 
restricfted, its prejudices against foreigners were easily aroused. 
Such was the case on the present occasion. Seward's friendly 
attitude toward foreigners, as indicated by his school policy, 
appeared to man\- to be a yielding to un-American influences, 
and to proceed from a desire to gain political favor with citi- 
zens of foreign birth. A study of Seward's general political 
principles, however, does not confirm the existence of such a 
motive. These principles, as developed during this period, may 
be briefly stated as follows : To aid in the development of our 

' yUcs' Eiyisti 1: Ixii. 113. - Cf. IVnrkx. iii. 483. 



KIKST WIIIC. G()\'KKNOK dl' NICW ^■()KK. 2$ 

resources, immigration was desirable ; to attract immigration 
required easy naturalization laws, and .the extension of equal 
privileges to the native and the foreign born ; to make immi- 
grants as well as others good members of the state, it was 
necessarj' to furnish them with education and the franchise. ^ 
Personal s\mpathies may at times have colored his opinions on 
the subjecft of foreigners. In speaking of the Irish, he says: 
"I think them more generous, liberal, and disinterested than 
most other classes of the community," and "less exacftiug of 
this government than any other portion of our population.'"^ 
It may here be noticed that his mother was of Irish descent, 
and that he always expressed deep interest in the cause of 
Ireland. Seward's ambition touching this question seems to 
have been limited to a desire to promote the interests of his 
party, for he perceived that its prejudice against foreigners was 
narrowing the base on which it stood.-' 

The same liberal, and even charitable, spirit which char- 
adterized his administration in the foregoing respecfts marked 
also his treatment of the penal problem. He held that prison 
discipline ought to be tempered with kindness, the chief objedl 
of the penitentiary system being the reformation of offenders.* 
As such reformation could seldom be expedled without address- 
ing the mind, he recommended that provision be made to in- 
struct the convicfts who could not read, and to furnish suitable 
books to those who could.'' An oppo.sition paper, referring to 
this topic, jocosely remarked that, under Seward's administra- 
tion, "going to prison was not so burdensome, since one could 
have good clothing, substantial food, exercise in the open air 
of the stone-quarry, and the volumes of Harper's Library for 
amusement." " 

As the Whigs of New York had not, prior to 1S39, tasted 
the sweets of office, they were now animated by the usual eager- 
ness of a vicftorious party to lend their .services to the state. 
Ten thousand applications were received for fifteen hundred 
offices, the governor's hall being, for a time, occupied by the 
eager throng from morning till midnight. ' As regards the 
dispensation of patronage, Seward took higher ground than had 

1 Cf. Works, ii. 198-199. - lhi<l. iii. :iT9. ■' [I,id. 388. ■* Iliid. ii. 'iTd. 
= Ibid. 60.5. « nUitjidphii. i. 5-i:J. • Ibid. .")1.5. 



24 wilha:m ii. skwakd. 

hitherto generally been lield in the state, but he can not be said 
to have anticipated the later ideas of reform in the civil service. 
He considered a frequent change of public agents, while not 
essential to the welfare of the state, as an important factor in 
securing popular contentment and acquiescence. ' In the mak- 
ing of appointments, he refused to pledge himself beforehand, 
in order that his judgment might be free to make the best 
selection when the exigency arose. When that aro.se, he 
professed himself to be governed by considerations of the as- 
pirant's fitness, character, and availabilit}',- and never to be 
controlled by interest, prejudice, or partiality.^ He made it a 
rule never to discuss, by correspondence, the pretensions of can- 
didates for office."' Yet he considered it a hardship to have to 
pass by so raanj^ generous and confiding friends without the 
privilege of making explanations. ■^' How far a candidate needed 
and deserved a place, seems also to have entered, to some ex- 
tent, into the problem of .selection. Recommendations of party 
committees or conventions were not allowed to have authora- 
tive weight, since they would relieve the appointing power of 
his responsibility. " Removals for partisan reasons were evidently 
made, and the vacancies filled by the appointment of Whigs.' 
Partisanship, therefore, played its part, as was universally the 
case at the time. Within the limits of party, however, Sew- 
ard's policy in regard to the civil .service must be said to have 
been judicious. 

1 Autohiuijrtipliij. Tii. - IShKji'iipliji. i. 3SS. •' Ihid. 48i. ' Ihiii. 388. 
= Ibid. 468. '• lI'nrA.v, ii. 589. ' niiKji-iiplnj. i. :'.9;2. 



CHAPTER IV. 

FIRST WHIG (;()\-ERNOR OF NEW YORK. 
{('iinthiiuil.) 

Questions only of internal policy have thus far been con- 
sidered. Usually a state government is not called upon to deal 
with others than these. But under our double government, a 
state has sometimes to meet issues presented to it by another 
state, and occasionally it becomes involved even in matters affect- 
ing foreign relations. Both of these contingencies happened 
during the administration of governor Seward. 

During the Canadian troubles of 1837, an American steam- 
boat, the Caroline, had been employed by sj^mpathizers with 
the insurgents in transporting supplies across the Niagara river. 
A British expedition was sent out to capture the vessel. Al- 
though found on the American side of the river, the Caroline 
was seized and destroyed, an American losing his life during 
the fray. In 1840, one Alexander McLeod, being at the time 
in New York state, boasted of having taken part in the exploit. 
He was immediately arrested to await trial on the charge of 
arson. 

The question of the Caroline had hitherto received no satis- 
factory adjustment. The United States government had demanded 
reparation, but the British government had avowed the act as 
its own, and justified it on the ground of self-defense. Thus 
the matter had rested until the arrest of McLeod. The British 
government now repeated its former avowal and demanded the 
immediate release of the prisoner. ' 

In this matter Seward assumed the ground that, since the 
aggression had been committed within the jurisdiction of the 
state of New York, and since the case had entered her courts, 

' WelistiM-. Wiirkx. v. ll'.l-l';7. 



26 WII.I.IAM H. SEWARD. 

the question was purely one of judicial cognizance; if the 
avowal of responsibility by his government ought to acquit 
the prisoner, he would be acquitted for that cause alone, but 
the judicial proceedings would not be interrupted. ' This led 
to some embarrassment in tlie relations of the state and national 
government in as much as the administration at Washington 
accepted the British avowal as sufficient to grant immunity to 
McLeod. They admitted that the question was now one of 
international law, but disclaimed authority to arrest proceedings 
in the courts of New York. If the indictment had been pend- 
ing in a United States court, the president would, it was inti- 
mated, have directed a nolle prosequi, - and hope was expressed 
that the governor of New York would take that step.'* But 
Seward adhered to his purpose to leave the matter to the state _ 
courts. The embarrassment resulting from this conflict of author- 
itj- was increased by the fact that a Ignited States district at- 
tornej' acted, in his unofficial capacity, but with the permission 
of the administration, as counsel for the prisoner. Against this 
Seward repeatedly protested as an a.spect of affairs not calcu- 
lated to challenge respect from Great Britain, and as manifest- 
ing a lack of proper regard for the rights and dignity of the 
state. ^ The embarrassment was further increased by the firm 
insistence of the British government on its demand for the im- 
mediate release of the prisoner, and by the excitement prevail- 
ing in New York, due to the fear that he might escape his due 
reward. It was even rumored that plans were forming to bom- 
bard the prison wherein he was confined, with a view to the 
infliction of summary justice. In fact, the war cloud was alreadj- 
beginning to cast its shadovi- in the distance. Yet Seward main- 
tained that the state could not without dishonor, especially 
under what must be construed as a menace by Great Britain, 
retire from the prosecution.'' But in an interview with an agent 
of the general government, he expre.ssed his entire confidence 
that Mcl^eod would be acquitted; if not, he would pardon him 
and thus avert the threatened war.'' Happily for the peace of 
the two countries, the prisoner was acquitted, his declaration 

1 Worksi. ii. 549, ").57, :^v^K). - Welister, lI"o/-;,.v. vi. 311:;. ■' /;,;;'. \. 13:!. 
■» irorfe.9. ii. .558, .560-.5TT. ■■ DM. .574. 
'' Colciiian. Uff, (if ('riltniihn. i. 1.51. 



1-IRST WHIG (;o\'F.KN()K OK XKW YORK. 27 

of complicity in the affair proving to have no foundation. In 
this difficulty the more influential part of the state press sided 
with Webster, then secretary of state in Tyler's cabinet. ^ 

The McLeod case had placed Seward in a somewhat diffi- 
cult position. He had the excitement of the people of his 
state to reckon with. He also felt obliged to maintain the in- 
dependence of the state judiciary. On the other hand, on him 
quite as much as on the government at Washington depended, 
in this case, the contingency of a foreign war. From the larger 
political point of view, he insisted somewhat too rigidly on the 
technical rights of the state. The position taken by the British 
government should have placed the case be}-ond state jurisdic- 
tion. This was one of the few cases in which our political 
system has shown itself too complex for prompt dealing with 
foreign governments. The difficulty encountered in this par- 
ticular instance was removed by a law passed in 1842.- 

While the McLeod case was pending in the courts, Seward 
was engaged in another semi-diplomatic discussion. In 1839, 
a controversy arose with the state of Virginia. The governor 
of that state made a requisition on the governor of New York 
for the deliver)- of three colored, seamen charged with the steal- 
ing of a negro slave. The stealing consisted in their having 
aided in the escape of the slave, who, however, was soon 
captured and returned to his master. Meanwhile the accused 
seamen were held in custody in the city of New York. On 
receiving this requisition Seward decided, in as much as the case 
was of a grave characler and the proofs were somewhat defec- 
tive, to give the matter further consideration. Before the issue 
between the two states had taken shape, the prisoners were, 
for want of sufficient testimony, relea.sed by the local authori- 
ties of New York. But Virginia insisted on her demand, hold- 
ing the offence to be one " deeply- affecfting the general interests 
of the commonwealth."-^ Seward now assumed the position 
that, even if the affidavit were sufficient in form and substance 
to charge the defendants with the crime in question according 
to the laws of \"irginia, yet in his opinion the offence did not 

' ('/. liiiiiiiitiihii. i. .55:;. - ('(. ''. >'• StiitKlis til Liiiye. v. 539. 
■■' ll'oi/.-.v. ii. 44;i-.i{l. 4<iT. 



28 WILLIAIW H. SEWARD. 

come within the meaning of the constitution of the United 
States. He held that the terms "treason, felony, or other 
crime," as used in the constitutional provision regarding the 
extradition of fugitives from justice, embraced only those of- 
fences which were recognized as crimes by the universal laws 
of all civilized countries ; that slave-stealing was not a crime 
either in the common law or by the laws of New York ; and 
that the .surrender, therefore, of the supposed fugitives could 
not properly be made. He contended that the constitutional 
provision on this point was intended to establish, in the inter- 
course between the states, the principle of the law of nations, 
and held that the states were "sovereign and independent" 
within their spheres.' The adling governor of Virginia based 
his counter-argument also on the principle of international law, 
but contended that the offence in question was none the less a 
crime. Here Seward clearly had the better of the argument, 
although liis insistence on international law was somewhat ir- 
relevant. 

Soon the argumentative basis of the di.spute was shifted on 
the part of Virginia. In 1S40, Thomas W. Gilmer, governor of 
that state, renewed the correspondence, the Virginia legislature 
having meanwhile passed resolutions declaring the position 
assumed by the governor of New York to be a dangerous viola- 
tion of the constitution, and urged the governor of Virginia 
to open correspondence on the subjedl with all the slaveholding 
states. - Gilmer maintained that the case must be considered 
stri(5tly within the limits of the federal constitution, and argued 
that the clause treating of fugitives from justice was to be 
considered as ancillary to that concerning the recapture of fugit- 
ive slaves. This interdependence Seward could not admit, but 
he agreed to consider the question within the limits suggested. 
His conclusion, however, was the same. The meaning of the 
term "crime" in the constitution, he observed, must have some 
limitation; it could not include all offences which any state 
might designate as crimes ; otherwise the legislation of a state 
might virtually' extend beyond its own borders. The framers 
of the constitution naturally used the term in the sense in which 
it was understood in common law. ■' 

' Warhs. ii. 4r,->-.'-.4, 4.1(5. - II, ii!. 4C.il. •' Ihiil. 474 -84. 



FiKST wiiu; (',uv1':rn"ok of ni-:\v vokk. 29 

Tliiis the discussion coiitimied, extending through the 
greater part ol Seward's two terms of office. The grievance 
felt by Virginia was much increased bj' a measure passed by 
the legislature of New York in Maj', 1S40. This was an a<5t 
extending trial by jur\- to persons claimed as fugitive slaves. 
Such a measure had been discus.sed in the state before this 
controversy aro.se,' but its passage was, perhaps, hastened by 
it. Virginia now resorted to retaliatory measures. When Sew- 
ard had occasion to make requisition on the governor of that 
state for the surrender of a person charged with forgery, com- 
pliance was promised imly in case the three fugitive sailors 
should be surrendered.- In this course, however, the governor 
was not supported by the house of delegates, a majority of 
whom, while considering New York in the wrong, regretted 
his decision as not comporting with the duty and the dignity 
of the state. '■'■ The forger was shortly afterward delivered up, 
and New York was urged to respond by taking similar acftion 
in regard to the three fugitives. But Seward .saw no reason 
for reversing his previous decision, holding the two cases to be 
essentially dissimilar. Meanwhile, the legislature of Virginia 
had passed an adl to prevent the citizens of New York from 
carrying slaves out of that commonwealth, which acl was to 
be suspended when New York should have repealed the trial- 
by-jur3' law and surrendered the three seamen. It prescribed a 
rigid inspe(flion of New York vessels before leaving the harbors 
of Virginia, tlie owners of the vessels to bear the expense.* 
This plainly involved a discrimination by one state against the 
commerce of another, and Seward could rightfulh" complain 
that the acft was an attempt at the coercion of a sister-state. 
He announced that New York would neither yield nor retaliate, 
but that she could not discuss the original subject of contro- 
versy while \'irginia maintained her aggressive attitude.'' 

In this contention with New York Virginia did not stand 
alone. She had the sympathy, and in some cases the support, 
of the other slaveholding states. Georgia, about the same time, 
made somewhat similar demands on New York and on Maine, 
which, however, were not complied with. South Carolina, al- 

I H'.i/7..v. ii. .")U(;. -' IIihI. ■Mi). ' .Vi/i.s' 11,'iiiyli r. \\. m. ^ Iliiil. 

■• ii'.ii/i.v. ii. ."lO;-:, :m'.\. 



30 WILLIAM H. sk;\vard. 

ways alert in the defense of what she considered southern 
rights, passed a law similar to that of Virginia regarding inter- 
course with New York. Calhoun, in presenting in the federal 
senate the resolutions of South Carolina on this subject, chose 
the opportunity- to descant on the dangers of abolitionism, ' 
thereb)' showing in what light he viewed the policy of New 
York's governor. Nor was hostile criticism of Seward's course, 
and that of the legislature of his state, confined to the south. 
Many northern papers expressed their disapprobation. JVi/cs' 
Register, for instance, spoke of the "injustice of the condudl of 
the authorities of New York, not only toward \'irginia, but to 
the whole south."- In 1S42, even the legislature of New York 
passed resolutions in disapproval of the position assumed by the 
governor. But Seward remained firm. Whatever of settlement 
the controversy had was morally in his favor. 

In point of constitutional law, at least as it was subse- 
quently interpreted, his argument was defecftive. Statutory crimes 
are as much within the provision relating to extradition as 
crimes existing at the common law. The laws of the state 
making the demand determine the question of crime, not the 
laws of the state on which the demand is made.'' But it may 
readih' be admitted that in this particular case the dictates of 
justice made extradition less imperative. Incidental to the con- 
troversy was the New York extension of the trial by jury. 
Here too, as it turned out, Virginia had more of the technical 
right on her side. B3' a decision of the supreme court, rendered 
in 1842, state legislation on the subject of fugitive slaves was 
declared unconstitutional, jurisdiction in the matter belonging 
exclusively to the national government.'' This decision appeared 
to Seward to contain "startling doctrines," while justice Storj', 
who delivered the opinion, considered it "a triumph of free- 
dom. "■'• 

Noticeable in this controversy is the stress laid by Seward 
on the rights of the states, within their own limits, whereas 
Virginia, to secure protection to slave property, insisted largely 
on the obligations of the national compadl. Noticeable also, is 

> CiiDij. (ihihi: -Jd se.ss., 'JTtli Coiiii.. 'ilo. - Xitix' Uniistcr. Ix. .').'). 
•■' Kfiituoky I'.s. Deunisoii, 24 How., 60, Oil. ' I'ligS i'"- Pennsylvania, 
Hi Pet.. .ISO. ° nuxjmph]!. i. .")95: W. W. Story. IJfc nf Stiirij. ii. :)ii-i. 



FIRST WHIG COVEKXOR OF NEW VOKK. 31 

his close adherence to the question of law, with only incidental 
reference to the moral side of the case. The rigid moralist 
John Qnincy Adams, while strongly approving Seward's course, 
could not help criticising him for "tameness of tone" as com- 
pared with the "insolence" of \'irginia.i An episode though 
it be in our national history, this controversy between two repre- 
sentative states formed also one of the many points in the con- 
fli(5t between slavery and freedom. 

' .1. O. Adaiii^. Mciiinirs. \. 4(11. 



CHAPTER V. 

KARLY AXTI-SLAVERY IDEAS. 

On retiring from his executive duties, at the close of the 
year 1842, Seward resumed the pra<5lice of law. His public 
career he regarded as closed. He had declined a second renom- 
ination with a view to avert party discord, for he felt that his 
principles were too liberal, too philanthropic for his party. * In 
this he was no doubt right, if his principles are to be judged 
by the opposition they encountered. But he had shown courage 
and ability in maintaining them, and this atoned in the eyes 
of the masses for his occasional offending against their accepted 
ideas of political prudence. His hold on the Whig party in the 
state was really stronger than ever; it needed only time to 
soften the asperities of political feeling. This Seward well knew, 
for he understood the art of holding one's self in reserve. His 
name was now known beyond the borders of the state ; his 
official contacfl with the general government and with another 
state had already given him something of a national reputation. 
With his political temperament, he could not but continue his 
interest in public affairs. Although he declared himself satis- 
fied with the measure of public confidence and of political suc- 
cess which he had enjoyed, it was but natural that his eyes 
should be turned toward the future. While busily engaged in 
his legal profession, he took and gave counsel on political 
matters, both state and national. For his party associates had 
confidence in his political sagacity, and in this confidence he 
himself shared. During the period just reviewed, he seemed 
at times to pride himself of his being in advance of public 
opinion, and often expressed his assurance of the vindication 
of the future. This trait in his characfler — a generous self- 

' B'Kitjniphy. i. 547. 



\ 



EARLY ANTI-SLAVERY IDEAS. 33 

appreciation — will find a fuller justification in that period of 
his life in which he came to deal with the larger and profounder 
questions of national concern. Of such questions, the one to 
which his maturer life was chieflj' to be dedicated was that of 
slaver>\ 

At this time — during the administration of Tyler — the 
slavery question had not yet become the dominant one in party 
politics. But it was a question that had long given tone and 
trend to the politics of the south, the influence of which was 
plainly to be discerned in the administration of the national 
government. After the enacftment of the Missouri compromise 
in 1820, the slavery question had apparently dropped out of 
politics for a time, but the .slaveholders' sense of insecurity had 
not been appeased nor the awakening conscience of the north 
put at rest. The mind of the north was but slowly and, at 
first, sporadically aroused, while the political self-interest of the 
south was constantly adlive. Hence the long-continued inequal- 
ity between the sections on the slavery issue. The establishment 
of Garrison's Liberator, in 1831, and the organization of the 
American Anti-Slavery Society, in 1833, were evidences of the 
northern awakening. The south now took alarm, and made 
bold to interfere with a time-honored custom of Anglo-Saxon 
freedom — the right of petition. Against this interference, and 
the cause which prompted it, John Quincy Adams stood up 
boldly in congress, but as yet he was almost single-handed in 
the combat. The general northern feeling was opposed to agita- 
tion. The abolitionists were therefore condemned by both north 
and south — by one sedtion as misguided individuals disturbing 
the general peace, by the other as hot-headed incendiaries en- 
dangering the Union. But time and development favored the 
cause of the north. The south felt, therefore, the need of sur- 
rounding itself with further safeguards. Chief among these 
was always the acquisition of new southern territory, for, if 
adroitly managed, such a scheme would appeal also to northern 
ambition and patriotism. The annexation of Texas, which had 
long been desired by the south, finally became a party question 
with the southern Democrats in the presidential campaign of 
1844. The Whigs, however, ignored the question in their plat- 
form. 



34 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

It was at this point that Seward first came into diredl con- 
tadl with the slavery question. Before proceeding to speak of 
his present position, it seems well, for the sake of completeness 
of view, to take a glance at some of his earlier expressions on 
the same subjecft. 

Seward had spent his early boyhood in a home where a 
few .slaves were kept as domestic servants, this being a common 
practice with well-to-do families in New York in the early part 
of the century. But the ignorance and vice of the black people 
of the neighborhood led him to suspe(ft that something was 
wrong, and determined him, as he tells us, "at that early age, 
to be an abolitionist."' It is curious to notice that one of his 
earliest expressions on the subjecft seems to countenance the 
idea that the national government had the power to work out 
gradual emancipation. In a patriotic address delivered in 1825, 
he remarked, in arguing the permanence of the Union, that 
"the north will not willingly give up the power they now have 
in the national councils, of gradually completing a work in 
which, whether united or separate, from proximity of territory, 
we shall ever be interested — the emancipation of slaves.'"'' In 
the summer of 1835 Seward travelled in Virginia and was there 
much impressed by what he saw of the efifedls of slavery. Roads 
were bad, towns unthrifty, and a general lack of enterprise 
noticeable, while at the same time the people seemed uncon- 
scious of the cause of their backwardness, and unaware that 
other parts of the country were enjoying greater prosperity.* 
In the same year Seward wrote to a friend touching the attempts 
then being made to suppress anti-slavery publications: "I think 
those err, who suppose that the efforts of the north to extirpate 
abolitionism will tranquilize the South."'' This remark pointed 
to a better understanding of the slavery question than was then 
usual with the average politician. Still the evils of slavery 
seem not to have claimed much of Seward's attention during 
the next few years. In 1838, the American Anti-Slavery Society 
resolved that abolitionists should inquire into the sentiments 
of candidates for office. Such inquiries were direcfted to Seward 
when a candidate for governor. His answers, while conveying 

' Aiitfihiogrdplty, *JS. - M'i)/7r.s'. iii. lO."). ■' li'uxiniiiliii. i. 2iiS. 
•• Ibid. 393. 



EARLY ANTI SLAVERY IDEAS. 35 

the idea of opposition to slavery, were marked by something 
of the politician's evasiveness.' They were not satisfacftor}- to 
many of the abolitionists, Gerrit Smith being one of the dis- 
satisfied.- But Seward's firmness in the Virginia controversy 
convinced them that he was on their side, if not one of their 
number. He then took occasion to assert Ir's belief that a 
human being could not, by the force of any constitution or 
laws, be converted into a chattel or a thing. He did not 
think that the national constitution was intended to have such 
a meaning. '* 

But Seward differed even from the moderate abolitionists 
— in motive somewhat, in method more. The abolitionists gener- 
ally placed the opposition to slavery on grounds of phil- 
anthropy, on the grounds of the inhumanity and injustice done 
to the negro race. While Seward was by no means insensible 
to these considerations, he was influenced chiefly b)- solicitude 
for the welfare of the white race and the prosperity of the 
country.* He preferred to base the argument for abolishing 
.slaverjr largely on the grounds of the evils resulting to the 
whole country from the maintenance in the .south of a system 
of compulsory labor. This argument, he thought, would con- 
stantly gain strength and favor, while the moral question would 
encounter prejudices, the growth of centuries.'' As to the 
methods to be emplo^-ed, he believed in the progress and effec- 
tiveness of the Whig party, holding separate political acflion to 
be a waste of effort. He held, moreover, that to leave that 
party because it was not sufficiently anti slavery in tone was 
to diminish the prospedls of its improvement. For his own 
part, he felt persuaded that, by remaining a Whig, his influ- 
ence would extend to a larger number of those who stood in 
need of knowing the truth." For these reasons, as well as 
from a feeling of loyalty to his party, he declined offers, made 
to him in the summer of 1843, of the Liberty party's nomina- 
tion for president. " 

Now came the campaign of 1844, with Polk, favoring im- 
mediate annexation of Texas, as the Democratic candidate, and 

' UKrA.s. iii. 4-Jii-:B. = Wilson, Rine atul Fall nf Sinn Patrn: i. 408. 
' VForfo. ii. .i08. ■• lliid. iii. 4:-!5. '^ lihKjrapliti. i. .ifl.'j. 
•= f/)M. vnii-TOT. ■ Ihiil. 67(i. 



3(5 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

Clay, who declared himself opposed to immediate annexation, 
as the candidate of the Whigs. Other questions entered into 
the canvass, but with earnest opponents of slavery the Texas 
scheme was the center of interest. Seward took an active part 
in the campaign, his aid being sought in different parts of the 
country, for it was felt that he, above all others, would be 
influential in persuading restless anti-slavery Whigs to remain 
in the party. ' His influence was cast in favor of Clay also 
after the publication of the "Alabama letter" in which the 
latter admitted that, under certain circumstances, he would be 
glad to see annexation accomplished. '^ For Seward held that 
Clay's election was the only alternative, and that if annexation 
were only prevented during his term, it would be time enough 
to take precautions for the future.'' His support of Clay was 
sincere but not enthusiastic. The force and importance of his 
utterances during the canvass consisted in the parts bearing 
on the question of slavery and on his own relation to it. 

While Seward opposed the annexation of Texas, he was 
not on general grounds averse to the idea of territorial expan- 
sion. Quite otherwise. With him it was an article of political 
faith, often adverted to, that the country's destiny was to expand 
both north and south, provided it could be done without injury 
to the nation. ' But the annexation of Texas would not be 
beneficial expansion ; it would lead to war with Mexico, would 
extend slavery and endanger the integrity of the Union. To in- 
crease the slaveholding power was to subvert the constitution, was 
to give a preponderance to that power which might be followed 
by demands to which the free states could not yield, and the 
refusal of which would be made the ground of secession and 
disunion.^ Here he made a prediction that found its fulfillment 
in subsequent events. If Texas had not been annexed, and the 
resulting events had not taken place, it is .safe to say that the 
demands of the slave power would have been less radical during 
the following decade. 

During this period vSeward sometimes spoke of the consti- 
tution as being perverted in the interest of the slave power, 
at other times he evidently felt impatient under its concessions 

' Bloijniijliii, i. TIT. ^ Xilex' Hiyistcr. Ixvi. 4:i9. ■' llo/7,.v. Hi. 274. 
* Cf. Work", iii. '^T:!. •• llihl. 253. 



EARLY ANTISI.AVKRY IDEAS. 37 

to slavery. Tluis, in referring to the three-fifths ratio, he ob- 
served: "This principle of slave representation is the Corinthian 
pillar of the constitution. Its base is sunk deep, and serpents 
hiss among the leaves that entwine its capital." He considered 
an aristocracy of wealth as unjust, and especially so if the 
wealth consisted in human beings, "yet such," said he, "is 
the aristocracy of the federal constitution."' In arguing, a few 
years later, the unconstitutionalit}- of the fugitive slave adt of 
1793, partly because it interdicfted hospitality to the fugitive, 
he affirmed that congress had "no power to interdidl any duty 
enjoined by God on Mount Sinai, or inculcated by his Son, on 
the Mount of Olives."-' This was assuming ground which lay 
close to the borderland of abolitionism. But he took heed to 
advocate none but constitutional methods, holding that the 
abolition of slavery was to be accomplished b}' political argu- 
ment and suffrage, and by the constitutional action of all the 
public authorities. That slavery would eventually disappear 
was his firm convidtion. The laws of political economy and 
the tendencies of population were hastening emancipation, and 
all attempts to prevent it would prove futile. The attempt of 
the slaveholders to widen their territory had made slavery a 
national concern. It could now no longer be said that the north 
had nothing to do with it. Slaver)' was now on trial before 
the people, and must go down. That Henry Clay was not in 
the vanguard of emancipation was occasion for regret, but the 
Whig party might be trusted to prove faithful to the cause : if 
it should prove false in the hour of trial, it would be time 
enough to look elsewhere for more effecftive agency.' 

Such in the main was the position taken by Seward in the 
campaign of 1844. The adverse result of the eledtion did not 
affedl his views. He advised friends in the Liberty party to 
employ moderation, and not to associate the ideas of abolition 
and disunion. The American people, he said, would lend no 
countenance to any other than lawful and constitutional means, 
nor were such means narrowly restricfted. The admission of 
more slave states was to be resisted, slavery in the Distridt of 
Columbia could be abolished, and amendments to the consti- 
tution might be initiated.^ He should remain with his party, 

' HoJ-te, iii. -i.iO, 2.")1. - IhUl. i. .5l:i. '^ Uml. iii. 370-374. < Ihxd. 443. 



38 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

but remarked at the same time : "I am for emancipation and 
against slavery, whether my party go with me and live, or go 
against it and fall."' 

In national politics events were transpiring rapidly. Texas 
was annexed, war with Mexico ensued, the American arms 
were successful, and more territory was acquired. What to do 
with this new territory as regards the question of slavery im- 
mediately became an object of anxious concern in and out of 
congress. The northern hostility to further slavery extension 
had grown stronger by reason of the late events, for the self-seek- 
ing of the slave power was now revealed in a stronger light. 
When the presidential canvass of 1848 began, the territorial 
question was therefore really the one of most pressing im- 
portance, but the politicians of both the leading parties hesi- 
tated to face the issue. Each party had in it a slave element 
and a free element, both of which it was thought wise to con- 
ciliate. The Democrats nominated a northern man, I^ewis Cass, 
on a platform which was silent on the territorial question, while 
the Whigs, dispensing with a platform, nominated a general 
who had won his distindtion in a war of which they had gener- 
ally disapproved, who himself was a large slave-owner, and who, 
though a sensible and honest man, had only "crude impressions 
about matters of policy.'"^ Out of elements of dissent in both 
parties, but chiefly in the Democratic, arose the Free-soil party. 
It disclaimed any right to interfere with slavery in the states, 
but boldly declared itself against its extension into new territory. 

In this state of affairs, what course was Seward as a 
pradlical anti-slavery man to pursue? Well might he have felt 
some dissatisfa(flion with the action of his party. ■' But he soon 
announced himself strongly in favor of the election of Zachary 
Taylor. In strict consistency with his anti-slavery creed, his 
place should have been with the Free-soilers. Party loyalty, 
however, and a regard for the highest attainable rather than 
the highest abstract good, influenced him to support the warrior 
candidate. He admitted the lukewarmness of the Whig party, 
"but," said he, "it is still the truest and most faithful of the 
two parties, and one or the other of them must prevail."'' He 

' Schuckers, Life of Chase, 72, 11. -' Taylor to Allison, JV. 1". 'Pi-ihnnr. 
May 3, 1848. ^ BvKjvdtiliil. ii. 70, 71. ' Wiirks. iii. 300. 



EARLY ANTI-SLAVERY IDEAS. 39 

considered the shortcoming of his party due to the inert con- 
science of the American people, but he seemed to overlook the 
fact that the aroused conscience could find but little comfort in 
a party that timidly ignored all issues for the sake of gaining 
what would seem like a vicftory. Apparently Seward did not 
at this time believe that a new party would arise expressly to 
deal with the slavery question. Said he to Whigs who desired 
to form a new and better party: "You will not succeed, in 
any degree, neither now nor hereafter, because it is impossible. 
Society is divided, classified already."' Here he showed less 
than his usual forecast. The explanation — aside from campaign 
assertiveness — is to be sought not in a lack of power to grasp 
the importance of the slavery problem, but in a too strong 
faith in the stability and effedliveness of a long-established 
party, somewhat confirmed, perhaps, by his earh' experience in 
the Anti-masonic venture. It must be conceded for the Whigs, 
however, that, as regarded the near future, their success was the 
only chance there was for freedom in the territories, and it was 
this future Seward had now chiefly in mind. Still he did not 
restrict himself to a consideration of the immediate future. la 
his speech at Cleveland, notable among campaign speeches for 
prac?lical tendency combined with loftiness of tone, he took 
ground which placed him far in advance of his party. He here 
announced a principle which came to be an important guide in 
his later career, namely that the first duty of American citizens 
was to preser\'e the integrity of the Union.- Though the public 
conscience was yet inert, he held that much could be done. 
"Slavery," said he, "can be limited to its present bounds, it 
can be ameliorated, it can be and must be abolished, and you 
and I can and must do it." "Wherein do the strength and 
security of slavery lie? You answer that they lie in the con- 
stitution of the United States, and in the constitutions and laws 
of all slaveholding states. Not at all. They lie in the errone- 
ous sentiment of the American people." "Inculcate, then, the 
love of freedom and the equal rights of man, under the paternal 
roof; . . . reform your code — extend a cordial welcome to the 
fugitive who lays his weary limbs at your door, and defend 
him as you would your paternal gods ; corredl your own error, 

' Works, iii. 'iiH. '■' llikl. 29.3. 



40 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

that slavery has any constitutional guaranty' whicli may not be 
released, and ought not to be relinquished." "Inculcate that 
. . . executive authority can forbear to favor slavery ; that 
Congress can debate ; that Congress at least can mediate with 
the slaveholding states, that at least future generations might 
be bought and given up to freedom, . . . Do all this and incul- 
cate all this in the spirit of moderation and benevolence, and 
not of retaliation and fanaticism, . . . Whenever the public 
mind shall will the abolition of slavery, the way will open for 
it."' Thus pleaded Seward with anti-slavery Whigs, and his 
plea contains some of the most advanced opinions he ever ex- 
pressed on the relation of the slavery question to national 
politics. 

The presidential elecftion of 1848 resulted in the success of 
the Whigs. On their shoulders, more especially, rested now 
the responsibility of devising plans for the settlement of the 
territorial question. In the winter of 1849, the Whig members 
of the legislature of New York desired the eledtion of Seward 
to the United States senate. Some of the members, however, 
expressed an apprehension that, if eledled, he might pursue too 
radical a course. But he declared that he should not needlessly 
agitate even the question of slavery, but should labor to form 
public opinion by kind and peaceful discussion. The constitu- 
tional barriers which protedted the slave states in their rights 
would be as sacred in his regard as those which protected the 
free states in theirs.- He was eledled by a large majority, as 
the successor of John A. Dix, whose term expired on the fol- 
lowing 3d of March. Seward's career as a national legislator 
began, therefore, under what seemed to be the favorable auspices 
of a Whig administration. 

' Works, iii. 301-303. -' Iliid. 415. 



CHAPTER VI. 

IN THE COMPROJIISE CONGRESS OF 185O. 

The' congress which ended on the 3d of March, 1849, had 
failed to provide civil governments for the territories of Cali- 
fornia and New Mexico. This failure was due to a disagree- 
ment between the two houses as to the admission of slavery 
into the new domain. But the struggle as j-et had been only 
tentative and preliminary ; the responsibilities of decision in the 
matter were transferred to the new congress which was to meet 
in December. Meanwhile president Taylor had sent an agent 
to California to invite her people to form a state constitution 
and appl)' to congress for admission. A similar iilvitation had 
been extended to New Mexico. ' In this way it was hoped to 
avoid a decision by congress of the irritating question of slavery 
in the new territories, which had arisen through the introduc- 
tion of the Wilmot proviso. That occasions for angry dissen- 
sions might thus be avoided l>a-d been Taylor's patriotic wi-h, 
and that one of the proposed states would form a constilution 
permitting slaver)- may naturally have been his hope. For he 
must have seen that otherwise the south would never acquiesce. 
Being a slaveholder himself, he could, without losing his hold 
on the nation, go farther than a northern president in meeting 
the wishes of the north, but one is scarcely justified in assum- 
ing, as a recent historian has done,' that Taylor favored the 
formation of only free states out of the domain wrested from 
Mexico. In the autumn of 1849 California, taken possession of 
by 'niggerless' gold-diggers, adopted a free constitution, but 
New- Mexico was yet to be heard from. This acftion of Cali- 
fornia alarmed the south. It looked as if they might lose what 
they had schemed to acquire, and that under a slaveholding 

' Pres. message, Jan. 23, 18.50, Sen. Doc, lS-W-50, ix. l-'2. 
' Sehouler, Hist. U. S., v. 181, 189. 



42 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

president. Thus, instead of the tranquiUity and kind feeling 
which Tajdor had hoped to preserve, a storm of portentous 
character approached. 

In the position he assumed on the territorial question, the 
president had the general concurrence of Seward. The latter early 
became a confidential friend and adviser of the new president, ^ 
The ' ' rough and ready ' ' warrior, not being held in high con- 
sideration by many of the older politicians, found congenial 
personal and political traits in the new senator from New York. 
While both were new men in national politics, Seward had had 
much political experience and was well conversant with northern 
sentiment. The senator was the more far-sighted and adroit, 
but both were alike fearless and honest, and both were devotedly 
attached to the Union. 

The first session of the 31st congress was a notable one in 
many ways. In it sectional feeling ran higher than in any 
congress since the enactment of the Missouri compromi.se. The 
south now felt that their ' peculiar institution ' had reached 
another of its critical stages. Theories were invented and 
menaces were employed to convince the north that unless they 
could get their share of the common territories and other securi- 
ties beside, there was no safety for them in the Union. Nor 
was this mere bravado. It was the consciousness that power 
was gradually slipping from their grasp, in spite of their efforts 
to retain it, that made them so determined and bold in their 
attitude toward the north. But the disunion sentiment was as 
yet seriously entertained by but a few. •' 

This session of congress was notable also on account of the 
prominent statesmen who took part in its debates. Clay had 
returned after an absence of several years, and was now to play 
his last role as a compromiser. Webster was there ; so was 
Calhoun, the third member of this famous trio. Of the new 
members of the senate, Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio, and Seward 
had been elected distinctly by reason of their anti-slavery views. 
John P. Hale, of New Hampshire, a member since 1847, repre- 
sented likewise the more positive northern sentiment on the 
slavei'y question. Of other notable senators mention may be 

1 Cf. Biixjtd 11)111, ii. 1(11, 108, ll.-). 

' Cf. Globe, 1st sess., 31st Cong., 28, 2fl. 20:;. 1102. 



IN THE COMPROMISE CON'GRESS. 43 

made of Thomas H. Benton, of Missouri, Stephen A. Douglas, 
of Illinois, Lewis Cass, of Michigan, and Jefferson Davis, of 
Mississippi. 

Clay's compromise plan was introduced January 29, 1850, 
and embodied the following as its main features : the admission 
of California with her free constitution ; the establishment of 
territorial governments in the remainder of the territory acquired 
from Mexico, without conditions regarding slavery ; a declara- 
tion that it was inexpedient to abolish slavery in the District 
of Columbia, but expedient to prohibit the slave trade therein ; 
more effectual provision for the recovery of fugitive slaves ; the 
denial to congress of power to obstruct the slave trade between 
the states. ' These resolutions formed the basis of the subse- 
quent compromise measures and became the subject of prolonged 
debate. Clay's plan encountered opposition both among northern 
and southern members of congress, but the general drift of 
opinion was in their favor. The president's plan, which pro- 
posed the immediate admission of California as the most press- 
ing object of legislation, was favored by many of the northern 
Whigs, but found little acceptance among southern senators. 

Some of the greater senatorial speeches on these various 
measures were made in March. Cla}-, in introducing his plan, 
spoke in behalf of mutual concession, and urged that the north, 
being in the ascendency, ought to be magnanimous and concede 
more than the south, because it was easier to make a conces- 
sion of sentiment than of interest. The saving of the Union 
was his main plea.- Calhoun, being then an invalid, had his 
speech read by a fellow-senator. It was his last elaborate 
speech in the senate, and was filled with gloomy forebodings. 
As one remedy for saving the Union, he proposed the restora- 
tion by constitutional amendment of the equilibrium between 
the north and the south.-* Webster, in his 7th of March speech, 
practically took the side of the south and of compromise. He 
held that slavery was excluded from the Mexican acquisitions 
by the law of physical geography, that it was needless "to re- 
enact the will of God," and declared that he should not vote 
to apply the Wilmot proviso to New Mexico — to do so would 
be considered a taimt, an indignity, by the south.'' 

' GUilic. 1st sess., 31st Con!?., a4H. = Ihiil. '■> Ihiil. 45,5. " Ihkl. 480-81. 



44 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

It was under tliese circumstances that Seward, on the nth 
of March, made his first important speech in the senate, in 
favor of the immediate and unconditional admission of Cali- 
fornia. He first proceeded to show that California nuist be 
speedily admitted if she was not to set up independence for 
herself Her mineral wealth, her rapidly growing population, 
and her distance from the Atlantic states would make possible 
the accomplishment of such an object. Our destiny as a civil- 
izing nation, he held, would be partly defeated unless we .secured 
a firm foothold on the Pacific coast. The Atlantic states were, 
through their influence and example, "steadily renovating the 
governments and social constitutions" of Europe, and the Pacific 
states must necessarih' perform the same funcfions in Asia. ' 
This was in keeping with Seward's somewhat grandiose con- 
ception of American destiny, noticeable in several of his public 
speeches. But on this occasion his purpose was chiefly to 
emphasize the importance of separate action on the California 
question. He even went so far as to say that slavery might 
be left out of consideration, admitting that, in view of "the 
inevitable dismemberment of the empire consequent upon her 
reje(ftion," he would favor her admission even as a slave state. - 
He evidently felt satisfied that slavery would disappear in the 
course of time, while California, if once lost, might never be 
regained. For firm as were his convictions against slavery, he 
did not allow himself to be governed exclusivel}- by those con- 
victions, but understood the statesman's necessary art of adapta- 
tion to circumstances. 

He opposed the proposed compromise, and declared it as 
6is belief that all legislative compromises not absolutely neces- 
sary' were "radically wrong and essentially vicious."^ They 
bound future legislatures and precluded the right of adling on 
each separate question as it arose. Referring to Calhoun's 
proposition to restore the equilibrium between the secflions, he 
observed that this would change the characfter of the Union, as 
it implied that though one sedtion had a majority it should 
concede equality to the other. An equilibrium was, moreover, 
impossible, since the free states were developing faster than 
the slave states. On the subjedl of fugitive slaves he took 

' Uorto-, i. .58. - Ilikl. 63. " Ihid. GO. 



IN THE COMPROMISE CONGRESS. 45 

the advanced ground that the south was entitled to no more 
stringent laws, and that, if enacfted, such laws would be use- 
less because there was no public conscience to sustain them. 
If the slave states wished to have the fugitive slave law exe- 
cuted, they must alleviate, not increase its rigors.' This im- 
plied that they must be satisfied with .something less than a 
rigid enforcement of that law. And if the spirit of the consti- 
tution was really opposed to slavery, none will deny that the 
defec5live obedience of the north on this point had a measure 
of even legal justification. 

In regard to the national domain Seward observed that, 
although it had been acquired by the expense and valor of the 
whole nation, yet congress held no arbitrary power over it. "The 
Constitution," said he, "regulates our stewardship; the Con- 
stitution devotes the domain to union, to justice, to defence, 
to welfare, and to liberty. But there is a higher law than the 
Constitution, which regulates our authority over the domain, 
and devotes it to the same noble purpo.ses. " - He had no fears 
for the Union, and therefore he would enter into no compromise 
to save it. The Union was the creature of necessities, and 
would endure by reason of those necessities. The question of 
dissolving the Union embraced the issue whether slavery should 
be removed by gradual, voluntary effort within the Union, or 
whether the Union should be dissolved, and civil v^'ar ensue, 
■"bringing on violent but complete and immediate emancipa- 
tion." "We are now," said he, "arrived at that stage of our 
national progress when that crisis can be foreseen, when we 
must foresee it." "I feel assured that slavery mu.st give way, 
and will give way, to the salutary instrucflions of economy, 
and to the ripening influences of humanity; that emancipation 
is inevitable, and is near ; . . . that all me.'isures' which fortify 
slavery or extend it, tend to the consummation of violence; 
all that check its extension and abate its, strength, tend to its 
peaceful extirpation." He held that the di.scussion of slavery 
could not cease so long as slavery endured, and maintained 
that the south, whatever its opinion now, would in due time 
yield to the progress of emancipation ■* 

This speech of Seward was one of the signs of the times. 

' iri-;7,.v. i. a4-(i;. -* ihi<i. 74. ' ihuj. sfi-ss. 



46 WILUAM H. SEWARD. 

Together with similar remarks made by Chase, it betokened 
the rise of a new generation of statesmen who no longer were 
disposed to let the responsibility for slavery rest mainly with 
Providence, and who therefore had little faith in the righteous- 
ness and potency of so-called adjustments. These men under- 
stood the nature of the problem, which the older politicians, 
bred in the school of compromise, did not. Though fearless in 
expressing their convicftions, they spoke as practical politicians, 
observing the existing limitations, and avoiding personal bitter- 
ness. This made their positions the more difficult of attack, 
and thus the more aggravating to the extremists of the south. 
Seward's allusion to a 'higher law' that regulated the authority 
of congress was seized upon by many as furnishing them the 
opportunity they desired for hostile criticism. It was said that 
Seward had violated his oath to support the constitution, and 
in the heat of debate his expulsion from the senate was once 
or twice hinted at as desirable. But generally his political 
opponents contented themselves by referring to this new sena- 
torial idea in a tone of half-playful contempt. Seward's manner, 
which to many appeared somewhat superior, no doubt con- 
tributed something toward this estimate of the 'higher law,' 
but the chief ground of objecftion to it was deeper. While 
Seward soon gained the regard of several southern senators, 
there were others who expressed their dislike in such a manner 
that — to use a subsequent expression of Sumner — 'the lash of 
the plantation could be heard in their voice.' One of these 
was Foote, of Mississippi, who on one occasion objecfted to the 
printing of a certain proposition introduced by Seward because 
he thought it would .spoil the latter' s reputation, for the pre- 
servation of which he professed much concern, and then, grow- 
ing more serious, he expressed the hope that the American 
people would look upon this proposition "with pointed dis- 
approbation, with hot contempt, with unmitigated loathing, and 
abhorrence unutterable."' Another senator, in alluding to the 
author of the 'higher law,' denied him even originality. The 
original author of a higher law, according to his understand- 
ing, was the serpent in the Garden of Eden. 

Even some northern people felt some doubt as to the pro- 

' Globe, Ist seti.s., :il.st lloiig., 2:i0. 



IN THE COMPROMISE CONGRESS. 47 

priety of aiiiiouiiciiig in congress the existence of a law higher 
than the constitution. But in truth, the announcement pro- 
claimed not the existence of a conflicft between the moral law 
and the constitution ; on the contrary, it expressed a view of 
their conformity. From the circumstances in which it was 
announced, it is safe to conclude that Seward referred to this 
law not as a limitation of political allegiance, but as a guide 
to right legislation. In this era of high-wrought constitutional- 
ism, it was as fitting as it was bold to direcft attention to the 
truth that even constitutions are only means to an end, and 
that this end must harmonize with the general laws of progress. 
Nor was this with Seward a new idea ; he had frequently given 
indication of a similar line of thought. Though often called 
out by various hints to explain his 'law,' he prudentlj' refrained. 
Its succinctness of expression has helped to give it historic 
fame. 

After Webster had made his 7th of March speech, which 
proved so disappointing to the north, vSeward became virtually 
the leader of the administration Whigs. On the 2d of Jul}', he 
made another speech in favor of the admission of California. 
Again he urged separate action on the various measures before 
the senate. He should struggle to the last to extend the ordin- 
ance of 1787 over New Mexico. Failing in that, he should 
fall back, as he did in the case of California, on the people of 
the territory.' Slavery and freedom, he remarked, were con- 
flicting systems, whose antagonism was radical and therefore 
perpetual. When the present strife was settled, a new one 
would arise in regard to other territories, north as well as 
south.'' This being his belief, it must be considered somewhat 
of a mistake that he did not more strongly insist on the direct 
extension of the Wilmot proviso, for this was, even more than 
the admission of California, the great issue before the people. 
He sought, on the basis of the president's plan, to effect the 
same end by different means, namely by the admission of new 
states. Although the plan promised well in so far as both of 
the proposed states framed free constitutions, yet this attempt 
to avoid a direct issue on the proviso question neither had the 
desired effect of soothing southern sensitiveness, nor would it, 

' Wiirkx. i. U)4. - IliUl. lOH-10!). 



48 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

if successful, have settled the territorial controversy any more 
than did Clay's compromise. Like the latter, it gave color to 
the idea that congress had no power over slavery in the terri- 
tories. Furthermore, this plan was radically weak in so far as 
it proposed the admission of New Mexico, a territory then 
inhabited mostly by Indians, only two per cent, of its straggling 
population being of the European races. > To the advocacy of 
such admission Seward stood now in a measure committed. 
When, in July, it was understood that New Mexico had framed 
a state constitution, he moved her immediate admission, his 
strongest argument being that this would facilitate the settle- 
ment of the boundary dispute between New Mexico and Texas. 
However noble the ultimate object in view, this was an ill- 
timed proposition, and the more so for being offered as an 
amendment to the Omnibus bill, which Seward steadily opposed. 
Of the 43 votes cast on the amendment, Seward's own was the 
only vote in the affirmative.'- 

But notwithstanding his adherence to the plan of president 
Taylor, Seward was earnestly in favor of the assertion by 
congress of its power to deal with slavery in the territories. 
On June 5th, he had submitted an amendment to the com- 
promise bill that slavery be prohibited in the territories of 
Utah and New Mexico. As he had offered no argument on 
the subjecft at the time, his proposition was evidently intended 
as a test question. Seward seems to have felt that the Wilmot 
proviso could not be passed at this session. In this he was, 
as matters then stood, probably right. Whether the fate of the 
proviso might not have been different had its friends remained 
firm and united their efforts, must remain somewhat conjecftural. 
It was at least a sign in its favor that manj' of the southern 
members felt considerably alarmed lest it might become law. 
As regards numbers, it is known that, at the opening of the 
session, the majority of the house favored the proviso^ as well 
as a considerable portion of the senate. But the alarms raised 
had had the effecft of lowering the tone of man}', of changing 
the convidlions of some. The vote on Seward's amendment 
resulted adversely by 33 to 23. With the northern doubters 

' Globe, 1st sess., 31st Cong., App., 1443. - [biJ. 1447. 
' Globe. 1st sess., 31st Cong., 91. 



IN THK COMPROMISE CONGRESS. 49 

and time-servers Seward expressed in private his hearty dis- 
satisfaction, and declared that he sometimes felt, when viewing 
the situation in congress, as though slavery must be the normal 
condition of mankind. ' That he used his main influence, dur- 
ing this controversy, to further the president's policy was due, 
therefore, to the belief that this policy, under the circumstances, 
would best serve the cause of freedom. And in this he came 
very much nearer to the truth than did the northern com- 
promisers. 

After the death of president Taylor, in July, more hope was 
felt by Clay and his supporters as to the fate of the Ouinibus 
bill. Taylor had with fixed purpose set himself against the 
proposed compromi.se. He had aLso boldh- put at defiance the 
didlation of southern extremists, and had been wiiming for his 
plan much popular support.'^ But now Millard Fillmore, a 
cautious anti-slavery New Yorker, succeeded to the presidency, 
and he felt more the need of concession. With the new admin- 
istration Seward sustained no relation of intimacy; — but short 
had been his service as presidential adviser. His course toward 
the compromise plan, however, remained unchanged. The 
Omnibus bill, loaded to death with amendments in July, was 
subsequently revived in its separate parts. To such of these 
as favored freedom Seward gave his support. He thus voted 
for California's admission and for the suppression of the slave 
trade in the Distridt of Columbia. But while the latter subjedt 
was under discussion, he submitted an amendment to abolish 
slavery in the federal districft, with compensation to the slave- 
holders. He took this adlion because the original bill had been 
so amended that he could not vote for it, and because he held, 
as regarded the time for abolishing slavery in the distridl, 
that the first time was the right one.-* This amendment 
gave rise to considerable bitterness of debate. One of the 
southern senators declared that he should not vote for the 
original bill after this ; it was impossible to satisfy certain 
gentlemen. "To attain their objects they would wade through 
the blood knee-deep of the whole south, and over the wreck 
of this Union." Another considered this a proposition to dis- 

' Bkxjriiiihii. ii. 138, 139. * Cf. Sohouler, Hist. V. S., v. 183, 18.i. 
» Ghilic. 1st sess.. :nst Cong.. .Vpj)., ir,42. 1IU9. 4 



.'iO WII.LIAM H. SEWARD. 

solve the Union, and in every way " unpardonably reprehensi- 
ble." A third senator likened it to a fire-brand thrown into 
the senate. Many northern senators opposed it as untimely and 
likely to defeat the original bill. But Hale and Chase expressed 
their approval, the latter admitting the corredlness of a remark 
made that this was a step toward the abolition of slavery' itself; 
"and gentlemen deceive themselves," said he, "if they suppose 
it is the last step."' During this rambling discussion Seward 
remained silent. As a rule he took no large part in general 
debates, it being his custom to concentrate what he wished to 
sa)' in a few well-considered speeches. 

Seward's amendment was reje<fted by a vote of 45 to 5, 
whereupon was passed the slave-trade suppression bill, — the last 
concession of the slaveholders. When congress on the last day 
of September adjourned from its labors, the original resolutions 
of Clay had been embodied in legislation, and another settle- 
ment of the slavery question had been reached, which many 
imagined to be final. But Seward was one of those who fore- 
saw that the future would unsettle the so-called settlement. 

' Ghihc. 1st sess., 31st Cong.. .Vl'l'-- KJ-t'-J. '' wy- 



chaptp:r VII. 

DEKKNIXS THE MISSOl'KI COMPROMISE. 

Now there was a pause in the slavery discussion. The 
countrj- had grown tired of the protracfted debates of the com- 
promise congress. A disposition prevailed to let the disturbing 
question alone, and to abide by the results of the recent adjust- 
ment. In the presidential conventions of 1852 both of the lead- 
ing parties expressed their approval of the compromise acfts. 
The Whigs again nominated a military hero, but their last 
national victory had been won. A party that represented onl\- 
tendencies, and that in a half-hearted way, could no longer 
answer the requirements of times that were gradually growing 
more earnest. The growth, indeed, was not always apparent. 
Thus the Free-soil party in 1852 lost much of the support it 
had received in 1848. The anti-slavery sentiment was not 3'et 
sufficiently developed for effecftive independent organization. 
Nor were the old parties any more disposed than formerly to 
identify themselves with the reforming tendency of the nation. 
The road to chief political power, though running often in a 
northern latitude, had as yet a southern terminus. 

With the Whig platform of 1852 Seward vras out of sympa; 
thy, being of that class in the party who favored the modifica- 
tion or repeal of certain of the compromise measures. ' He 
appears to have taken no acftive part in the canvass of that 
year. When petitions for the repeal or modification of the fugit- 
ive slave law began to gather in congress, Seward presented 
those that were sent to him, and insisted on the observance of 
the right of petition, but he raised no new issue on the slavery 
question. He declared that he had never introduced the subject 
of slavery in congress, but had spoken on it only when it had 

1 lUniiitiiilnj. ii. Hit!, IKT. 1,ss. 



52 WIIJ.IAM H. SEWARD. 

come up ill the course of debate. As to the compromise 
measures, he was content to leave them to the scrutinj' of the 
people, and to abide the test of time and truth.' In January, 
1851, he suggested to a political friend a proposition to mitigate 
the evils resulting from the fugitive slave law bj- adding to it 
a proviso that when a fugitive was ascertained to be such, he 
might redeem himself, be redeemed by others, or by the state 
wherein he was arrested. With this he coupled a proposition 
for a plan of emancipation : that when a person wishing to 
redeem himself should show to a federal court that the laws of 
his state permitted, and his master consented, he should be 
paid for out of the United States treasury. This, he intimated, 
would be " a gradual emancipation with compensation and con- 
sent."'- But it is quite certain that neither proposition would 
have found any favor with those concerned, for slaveholding was 
in our history something more than a question of property ; it 
was — as Seward elsewhere often dwelt on — a question of political 
power. He .seems not to have attached much practical im- 
portance to these propositions, for he never brought them for- 
ward as a matter of legislation.'' But they are not without 
interest, as showing how far he, as a constitutional opponent 
of slavery, was willing to go to effect its peaceful removal by 
federal aid. 

During the next three years, congress was occupied only 
with ordinary matters of legislation, and some that hardlj- 
attained to that level. A great deal of rhetoric was indulged 
in to express sympathy with the recent revolutionary struggle 
of Hungary and with her patriot Kossuth, then seeking com- 
fort and aid in this country. Seward took a special interest in 
Kossuth and his mission, and in March, 1S52, introduced a 
resolution strongly protesting against the conduct of Russia, and 
declaring that the Ignited States would not be indifferent to acts 
of national usurpation wherever committed. He intimated that 
it might, in some contingencies, be our duty to afford even 
"substantial aid" to struggling nations.'' During this period, 
Seward spoke also in favor of the granting of lands to actual 
settlers, of internal improvements, of aid to American steamers, 

' Globe. 2d hfss., ;ilst Cdiig., .tTH. - Biaijiiiiilni. ii. UH. 
' Cf. WnrkH. i. lliT. ' Uihl. llKi. -il'.i. 



DKFKNDS THK MISSOIKI COMPKOMISH. 53 

of redu(flioii of postage, of surveying the Pacific ocean, et cetera. 
But one idea appears with special frequency, in his congressional 
and other speeches, namely, that this country was destined to 
pursue a course of peaceable expansion until it embraced the 
continent and even distant islands. ' He called this, on one occa- 
sion, "the great national crisis through which we are passing. "- 
To one who attempts to trace the tendency of Seward's political 
thought, the idea will sometimes occur that possibly his view 
of expansion had some bearing on that which he well knew to 
be the chief national crisis. Pos.sibly he believed that the 
southern tendency to disunion might be counteracted by min- 
istering to the feelings, common to both sections, of national 
pride and ambition ; that territorial expansion might thus be the 
means of strengthening the Union ; and that, through the opera- 
tion of social and economic laws, such expansion would inevit- 
ably conduce to the benefit of the free states. Certain expres- 
sions in his writings lend some support to this view, but after 
all, it is mainly a matter of inference. That Seward did not 
seek to avoid the slavery question, and that he would not have 
been content to let its solution depend on this merest possibil- 
ity, of this we have abundant evidence. The above inference, 
if it be in any sense a justifiable one, points again to the fa<5l 
that he wished to counteract slavery by all the means, diredt 
and indiredt, not prohibited by the constitution : furthermore, 
that he sought, as far as possible, to make his opposition to 
slavery rest on arguments that would appeal to the entire Union. 
But in so far as the latter was his intention, he seems not to 
have been fully aware of the true disposition of the leaders of 
the south. With them slavery was not a question open to ad- 
verse argument, however plausible. 

Presently, the perplexing subjedt which congress had sought 
to put out of its way was again brought into debate. When 
the thirty-third congress met in December, 1853, no suspicion 
seems to have been entertained of the impending danger. The 
south had made no special demands on the north for further 
concessions. Nor had the north yet offered to concede what 
had not been demanded. But in the earlj^ part of January, 
Douglas, as chairman of the senate committee on territories, 

» Cf. Wiirkx. i. 2-H; iii. 109, 188. lilG: iv. Vl'X. - II, id. iii. 186. 



54 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

reported a bill for the territorial government of Nebraska, one 
of the sedtions of which provided that Nebraska should be ad- 
mitted into the Union with or without slavery, as her people 
at the time of admission might determine. Later he reported 
a substitute which distincftly declared the Missouri compromise 
restridtion to be inoperative, and which proposed two territories, 
Kansas and Nebraska.' The issue was now fairly presented, 
and 'popular sovereignty,' though not a do(5lrine of Douglas's 
invention, became his by right of adoption. He explained that 
the obje<5l was neither to admit nor to exclude slavery, but to 
remove whatever obstacles congress had placed in the way of 
it, and to apply to all the territories the do<5trine of non-inter- 
vention. '' 

This was the chief danger inherent in the compromise of 
1850, though not generally foreseen at the time. For while the 
territorial policy of 1850 did not technically affe(5f that of 1820, 
it cannot be denied that the former logically made the latter 
indefensible, or I'ia- versa. It seemed somewhat reasonable that, 
so long as congress avowed the policy of non-intervention, it 
ought to give the people of all the territories the same option. 
Douglas had therefore an appearance of reason on his side, and 
his case was much strengthened by the extreme democratic 
aspedl of his dodlrine. But for a compromiser his position was 
completelj' untenable. Compromising excludes the idea of logical 
uniformity of pracflice : so long as a question is considered open 
to this mode of settlement, precedents cannot properly come 
into question. When the southern politicians, therefore, fol- 
lowed their northern leader in urging the repeal of one com- 
promise because it conflitfted with a so-called principle of another, 
they really gave up this plan of political manoe^ring. The 
north began to see that if compromi.ses could thus be tampered 
with they were hardly worth the making. Constitutionally, 
popular sovereignty was only a weak substitute for the stronger 
assumption of Calhoun that the constitution, by its own force, 
carried the right of slaveholding into the territories.* 

The Kansas-Nebraska bill stirred the north. It divided the 
Whigs, and gave the final impulse to new party adjustments. 

' QUtbc. 1st sess., 33d Cong., 22'i. '^ Ibid. 340. 
■> Vf. Globe. 2d sess.. 30th Cong.. App., 273-74. 



DEFENDS THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 55 

In February, 1854, when the senate debates were in progress, 
Seward wrote: "The storm that is rising is such an one as this 
countr}' has never yet seen."' Sagacious Clay was no longer 
there to devise new plans of conciliation, nor weighty Webster 
to enforce the propriety of supporting them. But new plans 
were not proposed. Both parties in the debate took their stand 
on previous compromises, the free state party on that of 1820, 
the slave state party on that of 1850. In the issue as thus 
presented, the south had, besides the advantage resulting from 
the plausible appearance of Douglas's dogma, the further advan- 
tage of attacking their opponents at their weak point. For the 
chief opponents of the adjustment of 1850 now came forward 
as the defenders of the older compromise. Why should those 
who opposed slavery compromises on principle, it w-as asked, 
speak of the special sacredness of such a compacfl? But this 
tacftical disadvantage was morally outweighed bj- the justice of 
their cause and the ability of its defenders. Of new anti-slavery 
senators who had entered congress since 1850, the most notable 
were Charles Sumner, of Massachusetts, and Benjamin F. Wade, 
of Ohio. These, with Chase and Seward, took the leading part 
against the proposed repeal. 

The debate began in earnest on the 30th of January, a 
week after Douglas had submitted the substitute for his original 
bill. The main arguments urged in favor of the measure were 
that the Missouri compromi.se, in so far as it prohibited slavery 
north of the line 36° 30', had been superseded by the principles 
of the legislation of 1850; that that compromise was unconsti- 
tutional because it denied to slaveholders their equal rights in 
the common territories ; that it had been violated by the north 
when they in 1848 had refused to extend the line to the Pacific 
ocean ; that congress had no right to legislate on the subjetfl 
of slavery in the territories ; that congressional non-intervention 
was the only plan of safetN^ ; and that the south had onlj' acceded 
to the proposition for repeal, not made it.- Butler, of South 
Carolina, declared, with much simplicity, that he knew of no 
sacrifices to preserve the Union which had been made on the 
part of the north, and that it were better for the south never 

' lliiiiiriiiihji, ii. 33'i. 

- Cf. (iUihc. 1st sess.. 38(1 Cong., •i7.'J-T7; App.. 334, 377-78, 347, 383. 



56 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

to take refuge in compromises. The decision of the present 
question was not likely to make an}' pradlical difference in the 
relative strength of the two sections. "The South," said he, 
"wants her heart lightened — not her power increased."' 

On the 17th of February Seward spoke. He maintained 
that it had been the policy of the founders of the republic to 
prevent the introduction of slavery wherever it was practicable, 
but that they had not attempted the impracticable. Thus they 
had prohibited .slavery northwest of the Ohio, but left the matter 
undecided south of that river. He held that the Missouri com- 
promise was a solemn compact, and that it could not be repealed 
without a violation of honor and good faith. If the Missouri 
compromise were unconstitutional, that objection, like all other 
objections, had been waived at the time, in return for equiva- 
lents. Furthermore, the slaveholding states had enjoyed their 
equivalents, while the free states had not practically enjoyed 
theirs. The compromise could not therefore be justly supplanted 
until both parties were restored to the slalus quo.'- This was 
one of Seward's strongest points, and it plainly indicated the 
nature of the motive which actuated the south in urging the 
repeal. 

As to the merits of the Missouri compromise, Seward ob- 
served that he did not hold a geographical line between freedom 
and slavery to be a perfect arrangement. He desired that all 
territory might be free, but since that was not possible, some 
line of division was necessary. Reasoning from his present con- 
victions, he should not have voted for that compromise, but he 
wished to see preserved the landmark of freedom which it had 
assigned. Seward as well as many of his associates employed 
much shrewd and able reasoning to prove that the compromise of 
1850 did not impair that of 1820, and that the claim of supersedure 
was a recent invention. This may be granted, but the point was 
scarcely worth the proving, unless it were to show the question- 
able sincerity of those who made the claim. If there had been 
no supersedure, there might be a legislative annulment. As the 
legal right of repeal could not be disputed, the question at 
issue was really a moral-political one, the defense and attack of 
a compromise being only incidental to it. With the one party 

' GUibe, 1st sess., 33d Coug., App., 'J40. - Wurkf, iv. 447. 



DEFENDS THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE. 57 

the question was, whether a compromise of which they dis- 
approved ill the abstract was not yet to be defended when it 
favored freedom ; with the other, whether compromises, whose 
general importance they appreciated, might not be safely de- 
parted from in cases which promised special advantages to 
slavery. This showed that the slavery question was becoming 
too large for compromise. As Seward observed, both slavery 
and freedom were more active now than they had ever been 
before. "The contest between them," said he, "has been only 
protracted, not decided. It will be a great feature in our 
national hereafter."' But while he held the slavery agitation 
to be "an eternal struggle between conservatism and progress, 
between truth and error, between right and wrong," he also 
thought that the conflict of opinion would be "peaceful in its 
course and beneficent in its termination. "'- 

Chase and Sumner spoke in similar strain. Both insisted 
on the maintenance of plighted faith, and on the duty of re- 
stricting slavery within its present limits, with the view of re- 
lieving the national government of all political responsibility for 
its continuance. Chase spoke with calm earnestness, Sumner 
with that boldness of utterance and that beauty of style which 
at once marked him as one of slavery's most conspicuous foes. 
Like Seward, Sumner maintained that the original policy of the 
government had been to discourage slavery, while now the 
policy was to favor it. "Our Republic," said he, "has swollen 
in population and power; but it has shrunk in character." He 
held that there was no place accessible to human avarice, to 
which the prohibition of slavery, like the commandments of the 
Decalogue, ought not to extend. ■' 

On the 25th of May, the day on which the bill was passed 
in the senate, Seward again spoke. He admitted that there 
was no hope of defeating the measure, but derived comfort 
from the indication that the day of compromises had passed. 
The Union he considered safe ; when it came to a question 
whether the Union should stand, "either with freedom or with 
slavery," the masses would uphold it. As to the effect of the 
repeal, he held that freedom might lose but could not gain, 

' Wiirtis. iv. 440. = Ihiil. idi, 40o. 

•' aiiibe, 1st sess., 3od Cong., App.. 303-70. 



58 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

while slavery might gain but could not lose. Still he felt hope- 
ful. The supply of slaves was limited, while the tide of free 
immigration was constantlj' increasing. Said he to the senators 
from the slaveholding states: "Since there is no escaping 
your challenge, I accept it in behalf of the cause of freedom. 
We will engage in competition for the virgin soil of Kansas, 
and God give the victory to the side which is stronger in 
numbers as it is in right. "^ 

' Warkx. iv. 471. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

PLEADS FOR THK STATE OF KANSAS. 

The competition for the soil of Kansas which Seward had 
alluded to was soon to follow. In the repeal of the Missouri 
coruproniise the slave power had overreached itself. It had 
gone beyond the point at which the freemen of the north 
would passively acquiesce, much as they loved peace. Emigrant 
colonies were organized in various states with a view to settle- 
ment in Kansas and the saving of the territory to freedom. 
The New England Emigrant Aid Society had been organized 
even before the Kansas-Nebraska bill became law, and the 
society had sent out its first little band of colonists within two 
months of the passage of the act. ' This alarmed the slave- 
holders, although they had been first in the field : it seemed as 
if they might, after all, lose at their own game. Counter-move- 
ments were rapidly multiplied by the slaveholders of Missouri. 
But they came not in the spirit of peaceful colonizers. Inti- 
midation and force became their frequently-employed weapons. 
The plains of Kansas now became for many years the .scene of 
a struggle that brought disgrace upon the principles of free 
government. This was the result of the so-called popular 
sovereignty, which was in reality the shrinking by the national 
government from a solemn responsibility. The actual state of 
things was aptly described by Seward when he later observed 
that "the popular sovereignty of Kansas proved to be the state 
sovereignty of Missouri.'"-' 

In October, 1854, a territorial governor of Kansas was ap- 
pointed by president Pierce. In March, 1855, a legislature was 
elected, but fraudulent voting played such a part that the free 
state men repudiated it, and called a constitutional convention 

' Wilson, Sloce Power, ii. U'lh. - M'orhx. iv. t!'i». 



60 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

to meet in the following autumn. This convention framed the 
Topeka free state constitution, elected a delegate to congress, 
and prayed for admission into the Union. In December, 1855, 
this constitution was ratified by popular vote of the free state 
men, the slavery party at present ignoring the movement. 
Shortly afterward, a governor, a legislature, and United States 
senators, were eledted under this constitution. But no laws of 
importance were passed, nor were such laws as the legislature 
did pass ever put into force. The scheme was rather intended 
as an emphatic protest against the pro-slavery government previ- 
oush' organized, and as an effective appeal to northern sym- 
pathy. ' 

Thus two governments claimed to exist in Kansas, the 
territorial government possessing something of technical legal- 
ity, the Topeka government liable to the charge of technical 
disloyalty. But affairs were unsettled, almost revolutionary, on 
the western plains. Freedom was fighting against slavery, and 
was under the necessity, for purposes of defense, of employing 
some of the same weapons. During the next few years, legis- 
latures met or constitutional conventions were held, at one 
time or another, in almost every hamlet in Kansas. 

In congress the Kansas question became for many years 
an important topic of debate. President Pierce, in a special 
message of January 24, 1856, recognized the validity of the 
territorial government, described the Topeka movement as being 
of a revolutionary characfler, and complained of the ' propa- 
gandist colonization ' of tiie New England aid society. He ad- 
mitted that there had been disorders, but none to impair the 
validity of laws enaifled by the territorial legislature. As a 
remedy, he recommended that provision be made for the admis- 
sion of Kansas whenever her people, being sufficient in number, 
should desire it. '^ In accordance with this recommendation, 
Douglas, as chairman of the committee on territories, in March 
introduced a bill providing for the future calling of a constitu- 
tional convention by the legislature of the territory.-' The 
calling of a convention by such authority could not meet the 
approval of- those who regarded this legislature as spurious. 

' Spring,. Kii.'iifids, .5V)-7><: Wilsdii, Slave Power, ii. 4BT-(;9. 

- .S'cti. I)i>f., WK^yi. vi. No. 4. ^ Gluhr. 1st sess., 34th Coug., App., 280. 



PLEADS FOR THJv STATE OF KANSAS. 61 

Seward soon afterward offered a substitute that Kansas be ad- 
mitted with her present population, under the Topeka consti- 
tution. On the gth of April, he supported liis position in an 
able and elaborate speech. He lield that if the admission of 
Kansas was to afford adequate relief, this remedy ought to be 
applied immediately. No rule as to population had been laid 
down in the constitution. Freedom justly due could not be 
conceded too soon. Irregularities there had been, but the exi- 
gencies of the case would excuse them. The proceedings 
had, indeed, been instituted by a party, but the ele(flions had 
been open to all the qualified voters of the territory, and the 
new state organization had engaged in no conflict with the 
federal or territorial authorities. Congress could refuse admis- 
sion to Kansas only on the" ground that it would not relinquish 
the hope of carrying slavery into that territory. Such a hope 
was delusive ; if the attempt should be made it would be at the 
risk of subverting American liberties. The political power of 
.slavery was passing away. The defenders of slavery had form- 
erly tried to avoid discussing the suhjecfl in the national coun- 
cils ; they now pra(5lically confessed to the necessitj' of defend, 
ing it there, by initiating discussion. Said the speaker: "The^- 
have at once thrown away their most successful weapon, com- 
promise, and worn out that one which was next in effectiveness, 
threats of secession from the Union. It is under such unpro- 
pitious circumstances that they begin the next experiment of 
extending slavery into free territory by force ..." He declared 
to the senators of the free states that the debate about slavery 
would not cease even if they consented to make Kansas a slave 
state. The debate would be transferred to other topics and 
other territory. If we examined the ways we had pursued 
hitherto, he observed, we should find that we had forgotten 
moral right in the pursuit of material greatness. ' 

A few weeks later Sumner delivered his famous speech, 
"The Crime Against Kansas," in which he referred to Seward's 
substitute as offering the remedy of justice and peace. In speak- 
ing of the merit of this proposition, he said of Seward; "He 
has, throughout a life of unsurpas.sed industry, and of eminent 
ability, done much for Freedom, which the world will not let 

' Olobi: 1st sess., 34tli Cong.. App., 4(l4-.5. 



62 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

die; but he has done nothing more opportune than this."^ 
Certain expressions used in this speech resulted unfortunately 
for Sumner, but his misfortune was freedom's gain. Slavery 
had now become the occasion of violence both in the senate 
chamber and on the plains. Another impulse was given to the 
anti-slavery cause of the north. 

Meanwhile, the debate on the Douglas bill continued. The 
report of the Kansas investigating committee, submitted in July, 
supported the position of those who claimed the territorial legis- 
lature to be a usurpation. On the 2d of July, Seward spoke a 
second time, the pending measure being now somewhat modified 
in the direcftion of compromise. In the course of his remarks, 
Crittenden, of Kentucky, perhaps the most noble hearted of the 
border state compromisers, appealed to him not to set himself 
against all compromising. The adoption of the Topeka consti- 
tution, which alone of the remedies proposed would satisfy Sew- 
ard, Crittenden described as impradlicable. With some reason 
he asked why their feelings had been assailed with so much 
eloquence on the subjec5t of the distress in Kansas if the terri- 
tory was to have no relief whatever.' But the question was 
not only one of immediate relief, and Seward rightly insisted 
on its wider bearing. Technically, however, the present appli- 
cation of Kansas for admission was more irregular than the 
application of anj^ previous state. As to Crittenden's plea for 
compromises, Seward remarked that, while personal and tempo- 
rary questions might lawfully he compromi.sed, principles could 
never be justly the subjedts of compromise. He should insist 
on the settlement of the Kansas que.stion and other disturbing 
questions by legislative majorities.^ 

No settlement of the Kansas difficulty was reached in this 
congress. The house passed a bill to admit the state with its 
free state constitution, but the .senate passed its own bill in 
opposition. Shortly before the adjournment, the house resorted 
to a questionable expedient for protedling the free state settlers 
of Kansas. To the army appropriation bill it attached a clause 
prohibiting the president from using the army to enforce the 
territorial laws of Kansas. Seward supported the house in this 
proceeding. He maintained that congress had full power to 

■ (iliihr. 1st sess.. ;MMi Clous.. .Vpp.. .'i4(). -' Ihirl. Tii:i. 7114. " Ihid. 789. 



PLEADS FOR THK STATE OV KANSAS. 63 

declare the territorial legislature void, and, therefore, to pass a 
bill to prevent the employment of the army for the enforcement 
of the pretended laws.^ Aside from the parliamentary irregu- 
larity of this proceeding, it was based on the presumption that 
the territorial laws emanated from an illegal authority, a pre- 
sumption which, however well founded, congress had not yet 
declared to be a fadl. Furthermore, this army bill proviso 
pointed toward an encroachment on the military powers of the 
president. The senate refused to assent to the proviso, and 
congress adjourned without having made the customary appro- 
priation for the army. After a week had been spent of an extra 
.session, called to aCl on this subjecft, the house finally receded 
from its position. During this session Seward again spoke on 
the general question. He held that before peace could be re- 
stored in Kansas, the laws of its conquerors as well as the 
conquest itself must be abolished. What Kansas wanted, he 
observed, was the freedom granted, or professed to be granted, 
by the Kansas- Nebraska law.'-' Optimistic as he was, and con- 
fident as he usually expressed himself as to the future of the 
Union, he seemed not always to be free from a foreboding of 
possible trials. Said he, on this occasion: "I do not know 
the fearful horrors through which either Kansas or the country 
is to pass ; but be they what they may, the destiny of Kansas 
is freedom." ■ 

Almost two years elapsed before the situation of the popular 
sovereigns of Kansas again became a chief topic of debate in 
congress. Meantime, even the Missouri borderers had begun to 
feel some doubt as to the feasibility of making Kansas a slave 
state. But another efibrt, more shrewd and less vulgar, was yet 
to be made. In 1857, the pro-slavery legislature had issued a 
call for a con.stitutional convention, but the free state party, 
chiefly because it considered this legislature illegal, refrained 
from taking any part in the choice of delegates. The conven- 
tion, being thus easily harmonious, formed a pro-slavery con- 
stitution. But for fear it would be rejecfled if submitted to the 
people, only the slavery clause was to be submitted, with the 
reservation that whichever way the vote went on this clause 
the rest of the constitution should be adopted. As the terri- 

' Warks. iv. r,M). - 11, ill. .5T-J. ■' Ilihl. 



64 WILLIAM H. SKWARD. 

torial legislature had now come into the control uf the free state 
men — no longer standing aloof on their Topeka ground — this 
was thus to be superseded by a new one. Such was the Le- 
compton scheme. It was adopted by the pro-slavery party in 
December, 1857, the free state men again refusing to take part 
in the vote. But in the following January, when officers were 
to be eledled under the new constitution, they took occasion 
to vote on the instrument as a whole, and rejeifled it by a 
majority of 10,000. This time the pro-slavery party abstained 
in turn from voting. ' Thus oddly mixed were matters in Kansas, 
but that the free state party largely outnumbered their oppo- 
nents was sufficiently plain. 

President Buchanan, in a special message of February 2, 
1858, accepted the first vote on the Lecompton constitution as 
conclusive proof of its adoption, and favored the admission of 
Kansas under that charter. - In congress long debates took 
place, as was now usual whenever the slavery question was 
approached. But not all northern Democrats were willing to 
give their sancftion to the Lecompton scheme. Douglas was 
among those who, while no defenders of freedom, were yet 
opposed to the forcing of slavery upon Kansas. 

On the 3d of March, Seward spoke at length against the 
proposed plan of admission. He reviewed the circumstances of 
the case, and maintained that the Lecompton convention had 
been called by illegal authority, and that its work had not 
been approved by a majority of the people. But his main argu- 
ment was based on the unwisdom of admitting more slave states. 
He contended that in the work of national expansion and develop- 
ment skilled labor was required, not that of slaves. •' The white 
man needed this continent to labor upon. The interests of the 
white races demanded the ultimate emancipation of all men. 
Whether this change should be effedled with wise precautions, 
was all that remained for the slave states to decide. "The 
nation," said he, "has advanced another stage; it has reached 
the point where intervention by the government, for slavery 
and slave states, will no longer be tolerated. Free labor has 
at last apprehended its rights, its interests, its power, and its 

' Spring, Kansas, ch. x. ; Schouler, Hixt. I'. S.. v. S8.5, 391. 
= Sen. Ddc. /,S.37-.W. vii. Xo. 31. ■' ir«i/-Ax. iv. (iOO. 



PLEADS FOR THE STATE OF KANSAS. 65 

destiny, and is organizing itself to assume the government of 
the republic. It will henceforth meet you boldly and resolutely 
here; it will meet you everywhere, in the territories or out of 
them, wherever you may go to extend slavery."' Speaking of 
the position of the slave states as regards Kansas, he asked 
whether they could compel Kansas to adopt slavery against her 
will. "To what end would they agitate? It can now be only 
to divide the Union. Will they not need some fairer or more 
plausible excuse for a proposition so desperate? How would 
they improve their condition, by drawing down a certain ruin 
upon themselves? Would they gain any new security for slav- 
ery? Would they not hazard securities that are invaluable? "^ 
The wounds of society, he held, could be healed onlj' by the 
immediate admission of Kansas as a free state, and by the 
abandonment of all further attempts to extend slavery under 
the federal constitution.-' 

These were plain and bold remarks, but, however true, 
they changed no slaveholder's convicftion or vote. The bill for 
the admission of Kansas under the Lecompton constitution 
passed the senate, March 23, by a vote of 33 to 25. ' It being 
defeated in the house, a species of compromi.se was arranged, 
which was but little of an improvement. It virtually gave 
Kansas no choice but that of accepting a slavery constitution 
together with a handsome gift of public lands, or of remaining 
yet awhile in her territorial condition. Seward, as a member 
of the conference committee, dissented from the report of the 
majority as offering an unfair alternative.'' But the substitute 
devised passed both houses and became law. When submitted 
to Kansas, however, the proposition was overwhelmingly re- 
jedted. After some time, Kansas again applied to congress with 
another free constitution, and Seward again advocated her ad- 
mission. But the question was no longer debated on its own 
merits; it merged into the broader question of the Union. 

To Seward belongs the credit of having been, during these 
many j'ears, the foremost among the defenders of the free state 
cause in Kansas. Nor was it a cause of which parliamentary 
defense was always easy, for the free state party was sometimes 

» Wnrkii, iv. (iOl. = Ihld. 505. " Ibid. 602. 

< Globe, 1st sess., :i5th Cons.. ViM. ■> Ibid. lT(i2. 5 



66 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

guilty of indiscreet and inconsistent acfliou. But Seward was 
skillful in argument, especially when it involved considerations 
of higher expediency and justice. His hopes, never failing him, 
had grown stronger of late. In the Kansas debates of 1858 he 
expressed it as his convidlion, that whatever disposition was 
then made of the question, this would be, for the free state 
cause, either the first vicflory or the last defeat. * It was pradli- 
cally the first vidlory ; yet it was not until secession made room 
for her that Kansas gained admission to the Union. 

1 WorJcs, iv. 617. 



CHAPTER IX. 

IN POLITICS, 1855-60. 

A brief survey must now be made of some phases of Sew- 
ard's political a(5livity subsequent to the passage of the Kansas- 
Nebraska bill. The Whig party in New York state finally 
merged into the Republican in the autumn of 1855. ^ In some 
other states the new organization had come earlier to the front. 
But Seward, the chief leader of the anti-slavery forces in the 
state, favored no hasty adoption of the new name. He was 
aware of the difficulty of making a new party organization 
strong and enduring. At last, however, he avowed himself no 
longer a Whig, admitted that that party had proved deficient 
in anti-.slavery virtue, and that it had met its fate. If it be 
thought by some that he adhered too long to the Whig party, 
this must be his justification that he, more than others, devoted 
himself to the task of raising it to an appreciation of its higher 
duty. In this he was not successful because the question at 
issue was one that could be effedlively met only by a party 
specially organized, by what at first must virtually be an one- 
idea party. Such a party was the Republican. 

During the time which intervened between the repeal of 
the Missouri compromise and the presidential nomination of 
1856, Seward had often been spoken of by his party friends as 
a desirable candidate for the presidencj'. He was recognized 
as being a leading representative of the most advanced as well 
as of the most pradlical anti-slavery ideas of the north. It was 
felt that success was more probable with him than with another, 
and that, if defeated, he would still remain the leader of the 
new party. '■' While not averse to this presidential idea, Seward 
left the matter with his friends, one of whom was always 

> Biography, ii. 354. ' Ibid. 276. 



68 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

Thurlow Weed. In 1855, he wrote that he did not think it 
probable that the slavery problem in national politics could be 
"completely and safely" worked out the next year.' The situ- 
ation was rendered somewhat less encouraging to the Repub- 
licans by reason of the large following secured by the Know- 
Nothing party. To this organization Seward was entirely 
opposed ; he had always dissented from the policy it advocated, 
and considered it as raising a false issue in a critical time. He 
would have nothing to do with a combination of Republicans 
and Know Nothings. 2 When the Philadelphia nominating con- 
vention met, his name was not presented, a letter having been 
received from him in which he declined, on the ground that 
the convention was not prepared to adopt all of his principles 
and policy.^ Although he might have preferred a different 
nomination from the one made, he spoke zealously in behalf 
of the party's cause during the canvass. Throughout the fol- 
lowing years he labored to promote the interests of the party 
in congress and in his own state. He seemed at times to feel 
burdened by his responsibilities in congress, and expressed a 
wish for retirement. Once he wrote: "I see true friends, and 
hear of so' many timid and fickle ones as almost to make me 
sorry that I have ever attempted to organize a part)' to save 
the country."'' These were private expressions; in public he 
was courageous and hope-inspiring. ■ When the Chicago con- 
vention assembled, in i860, he was the most prominent can- 
didate for the nomination, but again he had to give way to 
another. The disappointment of his friends was so great as 
almost to be pathetic. Nor need we doubt that he himself felt 
disappointed. But historj' has attested the wisdom of the choice 
made as well as his own magnanimity in the sequel, for during 
that memorable canvass he made a series of speeches that could 
not have been without a considerable influence on the result. 

In the political speeches that vSeward made during the years 
1855-60, certain ideas and tendencies are deserving of notice. 

He frequently referred to the slaveholders as a privileged 
class, as an aristocracy, as the dominant class in the republic. 
The basis of their power he considered to be their personal 
dominion over man and the guaranties afforded them in the 

• Bior/riipliy, ii. 3.52. = lliid. 364. » [bid. '278. ■* [bid. 448. 



IN POLITICS. 69 

federal constitution. He found no fault with the founders for 
granting these guaranties, but argued that their hopes of the 
gradual disappearance of slavery had been frustrated by subse- 
quent industrial and political changes, and that the constitution 
had then been perverted in the interest of the slave power. 
This privileged class, he intimated, stood on an enduring found- 
ation and was growing stronger and stronger.' "The question 
now to be decided," said he in 1S56, "is, whether a slave- 
holding class exclusively shall govern America, or whether it 
shall bear only divided sway with non-slaveholding citizens."^ 
In a speech made at Rochester, in 1858, he went a step farther, 
and declared that there was an " irrepressible conflidl " between 
the systems of free labor and slave labor, and "it means," said 
he, "that the United States must and will, sooner or later, be- 
come entirely a slaveholding nation, or entirely a free-labor 
nation."^ This was the announcement which created so much 
stir at the time, not so much by reason of its novelty — rather 
because the people were unwillingly coming to the same belief, 
and because a prominent politician should have dared to give 
that belief such emphatic utterance. But the true meaning of 
the phrase was often perverted. 

The above position of Seward was historically correct, and 
in the main consistent. It seems to confli(5t with his previous 
assertions that the power of slavery was passing away, but he 
then referred mor^ especially to the operation of moral and 
economic laws, now to political fadls and ambitions. Still, in 
the long run, the latter must necessarily adapt themselves to 
the former. Seward therefore strained the argument — assuming 
the course of development to be against slavery — when he inti- 
mated the possibility of the nation's becoming entirely slave- 
holding. Yet this might have happened, it is true, if the free 
states should have allowed themselves to become so far demoral- 
ized as to cease developing. But how could the nation, on the 
other hand, become all free so long as the slave power rested 
on an enduring foundation? How could a conflidl that was 
irrepressible find a peaceful termination under a constitution 
which, in a manner, recognized both of the conflicting parties? 
Yet Seward continually maintained that the Union was safe 

' Works, iv. 236, 271. ' Ibid. 274. ^ Ibid. 292. 



70 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

and that slavery could never be perpetual. These ideas could 
be founded only upon the supposition that the slaveholders 
thought less of slavery than of the Union, and so much less 
that they would be willing, in due time, to abolish it. There 
is some reason to think that Seward did at times entertain this 
hopeful view ; and to the extent of his doing so, he was quite 
consistent in what seems like contradictory ideas. But he did 
not generally, during these years, hold to a view so optimistic, 
nor would it have reflected favorably on his political discern- 
ment had he done so. In 1855, he said of slavery: "It will 
be overthrown, either peacefullj' or lawfully, under this consti- 
tution, or it will work the subversion of the constitution, to- 
gether with its own overthrow."' This implies that even the 
constitution might have to give way to a higher necessity. 
Nevertheless, it must be said that Seward did not consistently 
adhere to, nor did he generally carry to its logical conclusion, 
the idea of an irrepressible conflidl. He seemed to believe, or 
hope, that the conflicfl might be fought out with moral weapons, 
under the existing constitution, provided that right political 
adlion were taken. 

Such political action was, in the first place, to consist in 
returning to the original policy of the nation in favor of freedom 
instead of slavery. Slavery was to be excluded from the terri- 
tories, and the growth of the privileged class to be thus checked. 
Such a return, he thought, would be acquiesced in by all par- 
ties, would eliminate the slavery question from politics, and 
would end the irrepressible conflicft.^ With this change in policy 
was to follow a return to the principle of the equality of men, 
embodied in the declaration of independence. But for the repre- 
sentative of a party that opposed slavery under limitations, this 
was rather broad ground to assume. He therefore felt con- 
strained to refer to this 'self-evident truth' as "the principle 
of the political equality of men within the exclusive range of 
the federal constitution. "■'' This shows how curiously but ne- 
cessarily restri(5ted was the warfare which the Republican party 
might wage against slavery. It could not, consistently with its 
programme, diredt its main artillery against slavery as an in- 
humane and sinful institution. It was no wonder, therefore, 

' Wmks, iv. 237. ' Ibid. 318, 366. ' Ibid. 384. 



IN POLITICS. 71 

that some politicians of the south, crediting the party with more 
logic than it professed, were ready to believe that it must aim 
against slavery everywhere.' This party limitation also explains 
whj' Seward so often placed his arguments on political and 
economic rather than on moral grounds. 

The motive of the Republican party was, therefore, not 
that of improving the condition of the negro. Seward seemed 
desirous of having this understood, partly, no doubt, with the 
view of quieting undue feelings of alarm at the south. In the 
campaign of i860, he observed: "How natural has it been to 
assume that the motive of those who have protested against 
the extension of slavery, was an unnatural sympathy with the 
negro instead of what it always has really been, concern for the 
welfare of the white man."'- In another speech of that cam- 
paign he said, in speaking of the so-called negro question : 
"The negro is no party to it; he is only an incident ... It 
is an eternal question between classes . . . between aristocracy 
and democracy. "3 Yet we know that, on other occasions, Sew- 
ard often insisted on the requirements of natural justice. 

His speeches during this period were pradtical and serious 
in tone, but animated by a feeling that vidtory over the slave 
power was almost achieved : it was necessary only to bring the 
Republican party into power and to support its principles. He 
believed that the last slavery-supporting Democrat had already 
been born. The reason for this belief was that, in his opinion, 
slavery could pay no longer, and that the partisan alluded to 
would not work for a cause that did not pay. In this connec- 
tion, Seward made this rather curious announcement: "I pro- 
pose to pay all kinds of patriots hereafter, just as they come. 
I propo.se to pay them fair consideration if they will only be 
true to freedom. I propose to gratify all their aspirations for 
wealth and power, as much as the slave states can."*" This 
probably referred to the disposition that the Republican party, 
on coming into power, could make of its patronage; but it 
hardly seems like a high-minded allusion. Seldom, indeed, was 
it that Seward alluded to things quite so pradlical. 

The nearer the victory of the new party was seen to be, 

' Cf. Globe, 3d sess., 34th Cong., 153. « Wvrhs, iv. 313. » lUd. 373. 
« Ibid. 360. 



rl, WIL,UAM H. SEWARD. 

the more moderate became Seward's tone. This is explained 
partly by the fadl that aggressive work was now less necessary, 
partly by an undoubted feeling on his part that moderation 
might prove effecflive in counteradling what tendencies there 
existed toward disunion. In 1856, he had observed that the 
American people were under the responsibility not only of pre- 
serving the Union but also of making it serve the cause of 
justice and humanity, and that neglecft of the latter responsi- 
bility involved the chief peril to which the Union itself was 
exposed. 1 In i860, there was a change, not in spirit, but in 
emphasis. Said he: "There are few men- — and there ought 
to be fe\^ — who would be so intent on the subje(5t of estab- 
lishing freedom that they would consent to a subversion of the 
Union to produce it, because the Union is a positive benefit, 
nay, an absolute necessity, and to save the Union, men may 
naturally dare to dela}'."^ In a politital speech which he made 
in congress in February, i860, and which Garrison charadterized 
as Seward's 'bid for the presidency,' he spoke thus to the 
senators from the slave states: "We are excluded justly, 
wisely and contentedly from all political power and responsi- 
bility in your capital states." "Use your authority to main- 
tain what system you plea.se." The north bore no ill will to- 
ward the south. They were all brethren. "We have never," 
said he, "been more patient, and never loved the representa- 
tives of other sections more than now."^ 

The Union was now becoming the leading subjecft also in 
Seward's mind, as it had formerly been with so many of the 
northern compromisers. While he considered the Union really 
safe by reason of the many bonds which held it together, he 
yet thought it possible that the slaveholders might, in a season 
of high excitement, secede from it, but believed that they would 
soon recover from their delusion and return. * To this personal 
belief was added some of that exaggerated confidence in the 
future which the statesman seems to need for effecftive leader- 
ship. This circumstance made his views seem the more hope- 
ful. A knowledge of these facfts will aid towards a better under- 
standing of the part that Seward sustained in the last congress 
before the war. 

' TForfcs, iv. 374. ^ Ibid. 35.5. " Ihid. G33-36. ' Cf. ibid. 348. 



CHAPTER X. 

IN THE LAST CONGRESS BEFORE THE WAR. 

Before proceeding to consider the course that Seward pur- 
sued on the national question, at this crilical period, it seems 
well at least to enumerate some of the other subjects of legis- 
lation that engaged his attention. He served for many years 
on the committee on commerce, and was much interested in the 
establishment of telegraphic communication between the Atlantic 
and the Pacific states, and between the United States and Europe. 
In 1857 he introduced a bill to carry out the plan of Cyrus W. 
Field for the laying of a cable, in partnership with Great Britain, 
between Newfoundland and Ireland. The plan was opposed by 
many as visionary, by others as likely, if carried out, to en- 
danger the country in case of war with a foreign state. Sew- 
ard spoke of the manifold benefits that would result, and pre- 
dicted that the reality would far exceed the expedlations. ^ The 
bill became law, and the plan was carried into execution ; but 
its success was, for the time, of only short duration. On the 
question of tariffs, Seward was, by reason of his broad views 
of governmental dutj', naturally a protedtionist, but he took no 
very prominent part in such tariiF debates as occurred during 
these j'ears. The national independence and the home market 
arguments were chiefly touched upon in his remarks on the 
Subjecft. When, in 1859, the subjedl of the acquisition of Cuba 
was introduced, bj' action of the committee on foreign relations, 
Seward, being a member of the committee, dissented from the 
majority's report in favor of that project. But he would not 
oppose the acquisition when it could be peacefully and honor- 
ably effected. This would depend on the coincidence of national 
opportunity and necessity, which he did not believe then to 

' Globe, 3d sess., 34th Cong.. 422. 



74 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

exist. ' It is noticeable that, in oppo.sing the Cuba scheme, he 
all but omitted mention of its evident bearing on slaverj'. He 
thought it better not to use anti-slavery arguments when others 
might suffice. 

Of all measures of legislation, however, aside from those 
involving the slavery question, none received more of Seward's 
attention than that of constructing a railroad to the Pacific. 
As early as 1854 he had been placed on a select committee of 
nine that was to consider this subject. In 1858, a bill was re- 
ported by the committee, of which W. M. Gwin, of California, 
was chairman, directing the president to invite propositions for 
the building of such a road from some point in western Mis- 
souri to San Francisco. Seward would have preferred a more 
northerly route, but he strongly supported the b'll in debate, 
holding that the importance of the enterprise could not be ex- 
aggerated, that it would realize the discovery of the western 
passage that Columbus supposed he was making, that it was 
necessary for administrative purposes, and that it was especially 
important as a means of firmly uniting the extreme west with 
the rest of the Union. For his own part, he should have pre- 
ferred to have the road built directly by the government, the 
means to be obtained by increasing the revenues and by em- 
ploying the national credit. ^ This bill passed the senate in 
January, 1859, but failed to become law. Two years later another 
bill, providing for three roads, likewise favored by Seward, passed 
the senate ; but the Pacific railroad question was not finally 
settled until after the opening of another era in our history. 

For the time being, all questions but one were of secondary 
importance. The election of Abraham Lincoln, in November, 
i860, was generally felt to betoken a change in the policy of 
the nation. The rapid ascendency to power of a party whose 
policy was the territorial restriction of slavery marked a decided 
advance in northern .sentiment. It was this advance and its 
moral tendency that disquieted the slave states rather than fear 
of actual encroachment on their domestic rights. Having ex- 
hausted all expedients for holding what they considered their 
own in the Union, the southern politicians wished their states 

' Globe, 3d sess., 35tli Coug., .539. 

' Ibid. 1st sess., 3.5th Cong., 1585; Ibid. 2d sess., 35th Cong., 157-58. 



I 



IN THE LAST CONGRESS BEFORE THE WAR. 75 

to withdraw from it. For the taking of such a step, the re- 
served powers of the states were often held to afford the right, 
the difficulty of recovering fugitive slaves a reason, and the 
elecflion of a Republican president the fit occasion. Accordingly, 
soon after the elecflion, movements were initiated in several of 
the gulf states, looking toward secession. South Carolina pro- 
vided for the meeting of a state convention on the 17th of De- 
cember, by which body it was generally felt that secession would 
be initiated. 

The national outlook was therefore gloomy when the second 
session of the thirty-sixth congress met, December 3d. Nor was 
the president's message destined to make the outlook brighter. 
Buchanan deprecated the slavery agitation at the north in the 
usual formulas, and while he argued against the right to secede, 
he likewise disallowed the right of employing force against a 
seceding state. The spirit of the message, though loyal, was 
weak and apologetic. ' But such was not the spirit of the south- 
ern members of congress. Some of them spoke boldly in favor 
of secession, others more temperately. Thej' seemed to have 
chosen their lot for weal or for woe, and if conciliatory meas- 
ures were to be offered, they looked to the northern members 
to propose them. War they hardly expeded, holding that the 
northern leaders well knew that they could not succeed in a 
war against the southern states. But if coercion should be 
attempted, then war would come, and they intended to prepare 
for it. 2 

In the early weeks of this congress Seward remained mostly 
silent on the national issue. On the 8th of December, he wrote : 
"I am, thus far, silent, not because I am thinking of propos- 
ing compromises, but because I wish to avoid, myself, and re- 
strain other Republicans, from intermeddling, just now — when 
concession, or solicitation, or solicitude, would encourage, and 
demonstrations of firmness of purpose would exasperate. " •'' In 
another letter he wrote: "The ultra-Southern men mean to 
break up the Union, not really for the grievances of which 
they complain, but from cherished disloyalty and ambition. The 

1 QXahe, 2d sess., 3Cth Cong., App., 1-4. 

» C/. Iverson, of Ga., anJ Cliugman, of N. C, Olobc, 2d sess., 36th 
Cong., 11-13, 733. » Bioijraphy, ii. 480. 



76 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

President, and all Union men here, are alarmed and despondent. 
The Republicans who come here are ignorant of the real design 
or danger. I begin to see my way through, without sacrifice 
of principle."' From these expressions, as well as from others 
occurring in his letters of this period, it appears that he was 
aware that disunion influences were at work in the departments 
of the government, and that he was busily conferring and 
planning how to countera<5l them. 

When, on the 20th of December, a senate committee of 
thirteen was appointed to consider the state of the Union, Sew- 
ard was made one of its members. The most adlive members 
of the committee were naturally those from the border states. 
Crittenden submitted to it, two days later, a series of propo- 
sitions of the nature of a compromise, the most important of 
which was the one relating to a division of the territories on 
the former Missouri compromise line. These propositions, in 
the form of an amendment to the constitution, were repeatedly 
urged upon the attention of the senate by their Union-loving 
author. But they found no favor with the Republican members, 
and were generally considered inadequate by those from the 
extreme south. The habit of compromising, however, had not 
been shaken off by the north. Though this particular attempt 
failed to meet their approval, they were not unwilling to con- 
sider other plans. This was the disposition especially in the 
house of representatives, where a Union committee of thirty- 
three members had been appointed. Here various propositions 
were made from time to time, with a view to appease the south. 
But the south would not now be appeased. The more radical 
men of both sedlions occupied at last the same ground in regard 
to compromises. 

During this period Seward appeared in no wise like a radical. 
He opposed the Crittenden compromise, but in the committee 
of thirteen he submitted, at a suggestion from Lincoln, and 
with the consent of the northern members, a proposition that 
"the Constitution should never be altered, so as to authorize 
Congress to abolish, or interfere with .slavery in the States." 
This was accepted. He submitted, in like manner, two other 
propositions, the one providing a trial by jury for fugitive slaves, 

1 Biography, ii. 478. 



IN THE LAST CONGRESS BEFORE THE WAR. 77 

the other requesting congress to recommend to all the states a 
revision of obnoxious state legislation. But these were not 
adopted by the committee. ' 

On the 2ist of December, the day after the secession of 
South Carolina, Seward spoke on the political situation before 
the New England societj^ of New York. His tone on this occa- 
sion was so moderate and pacifying as almost to convey the 
impression that also secession might have an apology. It was 
not strange, he thought, that one or more members of the 
federal family should, at times, become dissatisfied and wish to 
withdraw. But such a thing was unwise and unnatural; the 
states were always intended to remain together. As to the 
manner of treating the states that desired to leave the Union, 
he knew no better rule than that prevailing in the famil}' — not 
to tease, threaten, coerce — that was just the way to get rid of 
a family'. It was necessarj' to keep entirely cool and entirely 
kind. Time would allay the passions. - 

In the debate on the Pacific railroad bill, in the early part 
of January, he remarked that this was a great measure of con- 
ciliation, of compromise, and of union. This bill provided for 
a northern and a southern route, and referring to it as exadlly 
equal and just, Seward said: "It recognizes distincflly that 
which we are all required to recognize : that, owing to the 
peculiar conformation of the country and the habits of our 
people, there is one interest and civilization North, and another 
distindl interest and civilization South." "This measure equally 
provides for favoring the progress and development of the north- 
ern civilization, and that of the South."" From one who had 
so long used his influence against the latter civilization, this 
seems, at first glance, like a singular statement. Nor was there 
much reason for supposing that the Pacific railroad enterprise 
could, under the existing circumstances, become a measure ,of 
conciliation and union between the north and the south. Seward 
did not, indeed, insist on this as the most important measure for 
the occasion. His general views of the state of the Union, with 
his suggestions as to what the situation required, were made 
known in a speech which he delivered on the 12th of January. 

■ Biography, ii. 484. 2 j\t. y_ Times, Dec. 24, ISGO. 
' Olobe, 2d sess., 3Gtli Cong., 3.50. 

LOFC. 



78 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

The fadl that Seward was to be secretary of state in Lin- 
coln's cabinet was now generally known. This, together with 
the facfl of his being recognized as the leader of the party that 
was soon to come into power, made people exceedingly anxious 
to hear him. Many came from neighboring cities; the crowd 
was said to be the largest that ever colledled inside the senate 
chamber. • Seward's speech on this occasion was a strong plea 
for the Union, and his arguments were such as might appeal 
to both sections. He began by affirming that he should adhere 
to the Union under all conceivable circumstances. He did not 
believe that it could be saved by debates on the powers of the 
federal government or on the unconstitutionalitj' of secession. 
Nor did he think that congressional compromises were likely 
to save it. As to the employment of coercion, he observed that 
he did not know what the Union would be worth if saved by 
the sword. Yet he did not agree with those who advised un- 
opposed separation. What congress, in his opinion, should do 
in the present situation was to redress, if it could, any real 
grievances of the offended states, and then to supply the presi- 
dent with all the means necessary to maintain the Union. But 
he desired the government to pradlice the utmost moderation 
and conciliation. 

His specific views as to what remedial measures might be 
wise and expedient were substantially as follows : i. Inasmuch 
as the constitution regarded slaves as bondsmen who might not 
be discharged from service by any law of the state into which 
they might escape, he agreed that all state laws which related 
to this class of persons, and which contravened the constitution 
or laws passed in conformity thereto, ought to be repealed. 
This might be a recommendation to repeal the personal liberty 
laws, or it might not, according to one's view of the constitu- 
tion on this point. What impression Seward at this time wished 
to convey is easily inferred. 2. Slavery had by the constitution 
been wisely left to the exclusive care of the states ; if it were 
in his power, he would not alter the constitution in that respe(5l. 
This declaration and the preceding were merely iterations of 
propositions that he had submitted in the committee of thirteen. 
3. Congress had full power of legislation for the territories ; yet 

> N. Y. Times, .Jau. 14, 1801. 



IN THE LAST CONGRESS BEFORE THE WAR. 79 

the question as to what laws should at any time be passed in 
regard to them was to be determined on pra<5tical grounds. He 
thought that after Kansas should have been admitted as a free 
state, the territorial question might be ' happily ' solved by ad- 
milting the remaining territories as two states, provided that 
this were otherwise pracfticable and that reservations as to later 
subdivisions could constitutionally be made. This statement 
concerning the territories was so guarded as to be of little 
pradtical significance. The suggestion in regard to two states 
must be taken to mean that one of them might be admitted 
without any restridlion with reference to slavery, — otherwise the 
suggestion would, under the circumstances, be meaningless. 
4. If it were pracfticable, he would have preferred a course differ- 
ent from the one just suggested, namely, the calling of a con- 
vention when the present excitement had passed away, to con- 
sider the question of amendments to the constitution. 5. He 
remained of opinion that physical bonds, such as railroads, were 
more powerful for holding communities together than mere 
covenants. 

In closing, he observed that, in expressing these views, he 
had not always suggested "what in many respedls would have 
been in harmony with cherished convidlions of [his] own." In 
political affairs men must be content to lead when they could, 
and to follow when they could not lead. > 

This speech was generally recognized as being conciliatory 
in tone and as likely to produce a good effe(5t on the border 
states. But northern papers conceded that it would hardly have 
any marked effect on the disunion movement in the south. 
One paper thought that the conditional promise in regard to the 
territories amounted to very little, ^ another preferred that a 
bolder tone had been employed.'' To the more radical aboli- 
tionists the speech seemed to indicate a partial retreat from the 
previous anti-slavery position of the speaker. Wendell Phillips 
compared it to the 7th of March speech of Webster.'' 

In reality, the speech betokened no defection on the part 
of Seward. Aside from the rather doubtful appearance of his 
territorial idea, there was in it nothing that could be construed 

> Globe, 2d sess., 3Gth Cong., 341-44. ' N. V. Tw/ics, Jan. 14, 18B1. 
• N. Y. Trilnine, Jan. 14, ISGl. ' PliUli^is-PumplUcts, ii. 'Disunion' p. 6. 



80 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

into a surrender of priuciple. Yet the pervading spirit was ex- 
ceedingly conciliatory. During this session of congress Seward 
certainly went as far in the diredtion of compromise as a man 
of his record could consistently have done. Nor did he, to out- 
ward appearances, always maintain his consistency. He some- 
times alluded to the southern interests in a gentle, forbearing- 
tone that seemed hardly in accord with his bolder utterances of 
the past. But there was an important political reason for this 
change of tone. Seward wished to smooth the way for the in- 
coming of the new administration. To gain time was his chief 
present aim, in the hope that time would bring a return of calm- 
ness and better reason to the southern mind. ' This is the ex- 
planation of his present policy, and in the light of it his sug- 
gestions regarding remedies must be viewed. Thus, when he 
suggested a future constitutional convention, as he did more 
than once, he must have felt that, if such a scheme were to 
have any effedl, it could at best be only that of delaying a(5tion 
in the border states. For he had early seen that the gulf states 
could not be arrested in their course by any reasonable conces- 
sions. ^ Nevertheless, he had strong hopes that these states 
could be recovered by peaceful means, and that the danger in 
which the Union was placed was only a passing one. He de- 
sired, therefore, that all adliqn which might tend to emphasize 
or widen the separation should be avoided. When the question 
came up in the senate as to what record to make of the with- 
drawal of senators, Seward wished no record to be made of the 
matter. He thought the less there was said, the sooner it would 
be mended. "I hope," said he, "that the time will not be 
long before they will be here again." ^ Conservative as was the 
Republican attitude, he thought that, for the objecft he had im- 
mediately in view, it was not sufficiently so. On the 13th of 
January, the day after he had spoken in the senate, he wrote : 
"Two- thirds of the Republican Senators are as reckless in atftion 
as the South. They, imagine that the Government can go on, 
and conquer the South, while they, themselves, sit still and see 
the work done. Without compromising any principle, I have 
shown the di.sposition I feel, to put aside this evil."'' 

' BiAiiji-dijIiy, ii. 497. ' IIM.. iHU. •' Globe, 2d sess , .3Gtli Cong., 501. 
■' Bidijriipliy. ii. 49(1. ■; 



IN THE LAST CONGRESS BEFORE THE WAR. Sl^ 

For averting the evil of disunion, Seward depended not on 
the healing influence of time alone, hut on the efficacy of a 
change of issue. This change is noticeable in most of the re- 
marks he made during this period. The Union was now his 
chief topic, not slavery in the territories. The general wisdom 
of this course, now that the party of slavery restricflion had 
become vidlorious, cannot be doubted. But the territorial ques- 
tion had as yet by no means been settled ; its settlement would 
depend upon the firmness with which the new party maintained 
its ground. When, therefore, Seward remarked in the senate, 
as he did after the admission of Kansas, that slavery in the 
territories had "ceased to be a pradlical question," since there 
were only twenty-four African slaves in 1,063,000 square miles 
of national territory,' he belittled the issue in a manner that 
did little credit to the creed of his party. His love of the 
Union was deep and sincere, and this partly accounts for his 
present inclination to make other issues seem trifling. "With 
the loss of the Union," said he, "all would be lost."^ But^ 
could the Union be saved by guarded concessions and gentle 
words? If not, might it not have been well to have manifested 
more legislative energy even before the 4th of March? A re- 
sponsibility for positive adlion in support of national authority 
rested also upon the shoulders of the existing congress. But 
the position of congress is partly to be explained by the unde- 
cided and expe(ftant attitude of the northern mind. Ev'.-'u poli- 
ticians who used to lead slackened their pace, and wished 
to refer matters to the people. Seward's mistake at this time 
consisted in his misjudging the determination of the south, and 
in his pursuing a course that tended to add to the feeling of 
false security that existed, to some extent, in both the south 
and the north. His mistake was therefore that of many, but 
greater because of his prominence. In so far, however, as his 
course might have been necessary to prepare the way for the 
peaceful organization of the new administration, its wisdom 
cannot be open to doubt. His emphasis on the Union alone 
tended, moreover, toward the important end of lifting the pend- 
ing issue above mere party, and thus of drawing together the 
Union forces existing in all parties. In this manner, at any 

' Worlis, iv. 074. ^ Biography, ii. 507. 6 



82 WILLIAM H. SEWARD. 

rate, he may have aided in preparing the nation for that struggle 
which he did so httle expecft. 

During these anxious weeks Lincohi often conferred with 
Seward by letter as to the political situation in congress. On 
the 26th of December, vSeward wrote that several, perhaps all, 
of the slave states would stand in a contumacious attitude on 
the 4th of March, InU that sedition would constantly grow 
weaker, and loj'alty stronger. Inauguration, he thought, would 
not be resisted.' Later he informed Lincoln that a plot was 
forming to seize the capital, and that it would be well for him to 
come earlier than usual, since the responsibilities of his admin- 
istration must begin before the time arrived.''^ 

The draft of the inaugural address was by Lincoln sub- 
mitted to Seward for comment and criticism. While strongly 
approving its argumentative part, Seward advised the omission 
of certain paragraphs as likely to give an advantage to the dis- 
unionists. He counseled Lincoln to manifest the magnanimity 
of the vicflor. observing that something in addition to argument 
was needful, "to meet and remove prejudice and passion in the 
South, and despondency and fear in the East. Some words of 
affection. Some of calm and cheerful confidence."'' The most 
important changes suggested by Seward were these: i. To 
omit the reference to the Chicago platform, with the announce- 
ment that the president would follow the principles therein de- 
clared. 2. Instead of a declaration of intention to reclaim and 
hold the places and property belonging to the goverinnent, to 
speak in general terms, and to hint rather at forbearance. The 
first of the.se suggestions Lincoln adopted. The second was 
adopted only in so far as he, at the suggestion of another friend, 
omitted the declaration of a purpose to reclaim property that had 
already fallen into the hands of the secessionists. ' The greater 
number of Seward's minor changes in the address were adopted, 
though in many cases not without further modifications by Lin- 
coln himself. The beautitul closing paragraph owed its origin 
and much of its felicity of expression to a draft made by Seward. ' 

The session of congress was drawing to a close. The de- 
bates on the various compromise measures had been long but 

' BU)(jr(iphy, ii. 485. = Ibkl. 488. = Ihhl. 51 :.'-!:■.. ' Mcolny and Hay, 
Lincoln, iii. 3ai, 328. 3.33. " Uf. ibid, faesimik'. oiipiKsilc ji. XU). 



IN THE LAST CONGRESS BEFORE THE WAR. 83 

unavailing. The Crittenden proposition.s, as well as the essen- 
tially similar ones submitted by the peace convention, which had 
met in Februar}-, were defeated in the senate, the former by the 
majority of only one vote. Both houses, however, had passed 
an amendment providing that the constitution should never be 
so amended as to authorize congress to abolish slavery in the 
states. But this last concession oflfered by the north to slavery 
was defeated by the succeeding events. 

Seward's career of public service extended beyond this 
period. But his subsequent career had a unity of its own. The 
work to which his energies as a national statesman were mainly 
devoted had now, so far as he was directly concerned, reached 
its conclusion. That work was the preparation of the public 
mind to offer resistance to the aggressions of the slave power, 
and above all, the directing of such resistance to attainable ends. 
Others had perhaps done more to awaken an anti-slavery con- 
science at the north, but none did more than he to make the 
demands of that conscience politically effective. Herein con- 
sisted his greatest service to the cause of freedom. Slavery he 
sincerely hated, but as a public man, he was obliged to temper 
his hate to the degree allowed by the constitution. While 
generally bold in proclaiming his opinions, he was on occasion 
wary and reticent, and — with the best of motives — showed a 
certain fondness for political indiredtion. This made him liable to 
be sometimes misjudged by the more single-purposed champions 
of the common cause. He was not always free from mistakes 
in judgment and in policy, but throughout times the most 
trying, he remained ever faithful, ever hopeful. 



> 



LIST OF AUTHORITIES. 



Adams, Charles Francis, An Address on the Life, Charadler 
and Public Services of William H. Seward. Albany: 1873. 

Adams, John Quincy, Memoirs of Edited by C. F. Adams. Vol. 
X. Philadelphia: 1876. 

Anti-Masonic Convention, Proceedings of the United States, 
Held at Philadelphia, Sept. 11, 1830. Philadelphia: 1830. 

Clay, Henry, Works of. Edited by Calvin Colton. 6 vols. New 
York: 1856-57. 

Coleman, Mrs. Chapman, The Life of John Jay Crittenden, with 
Seledlions from his Correspondence and Speeches. 2 vols. 
Philadelphia: 1873. 

Congressional Globe, from ist session, 31st Congress to 2d ses- 
sion, 36th Congress, including Appendices. 

Hammond, Jabez D., The History of Political Parties in the 
State of New York, from the Ratification of the Federal 
Constitution to December, 1840. 2 vols. Albany: 1842. 

Hughes, John, Works of the Most Reverend, Archbishop of 
New York. Edited by Lawrence Kehoe. Vol. i. New 
York: 1866. 

New York, Journal of the Senate of the State of, 56th session, 

1833- 
— Reports of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention 

of 1 82 1, Assembled for tlie Purpose of Amending the Con- 
stitution of the State of. Albany: 1821. 

Nicolay, John G., and Hay, John, Abraham Lincoln. A History. 
Vol. iii. New York: 1890. 

Niles' Register. Baltimore. 

Phillips, Wendell, Pamphlets. Vol. ii. Discourse on 'Disunion,' 
January 20, 1S61. Boston: 1861. 



86 LIST OF AUTHORITIES. 

Roberts, Ellis H., New York. 2 vols. (Am. Commonwealth 
Series.) Boston: 1887. 

Schouler, James, History of the United States of America, under 
the Constitution. 5 vols. New York: [1889-91.] 

Scluickers, J. W., The Life and Public Services of Salmon Port- 
land Chase. New York: 1874. 

Schurz, Carl. Life of Henry Clay. 2 vols. (Am. Statesmen 
Series.) Boston: 1887. 

Senate Documents, ist .session, 31st Congress. Vol. ix. No. 18. 

— 1st session, 34th Congress. Vol. vi. No. 4. 

— ist session, 35th Congress. Vol. vii. No. 21. 

Seward, Frederick W., Autobiography of William H. Seward, 
from 1 801 to 1S34. With a Memoir of his Life and Selec- 
tions from his Letters, 1831 to 1846. New York: 1877. 

— Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State. 
A Memoir of his Life, with Selecflions from his Letters, 
1 846-1 86 1. Vol. ii. New York: 1 891.1 

Seward, William H., Works of Edited by George E. Baker. 

5 vols. Boston : 1884. 
Spring, Leverett W., Kansas. (Am. Commonwealth Series.) 

Boston: 1885. 
Story, Joseph, Life and Letters of. Edited by W. W. Story. 

Vol. ii. Boston : 1851. 
Supreme Court Reports, i Cranch, 24 Howard, 16 Peters. 
Von Hoist, H., The Constitutional and Political History of the 

United States. Vols. 1846-1859. Chicago: 1881-89. 
Webster, Daniel, Works of. 6 vols. Boston: 1851. 
Weed, Thurlow, Autobiography of. Edited by Harriet A. Weed. 

Boston: 1883. 
Wilson, Henry, History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power 

in America. 3 vols. Boston: 1S73-77. 

• With the e.KMiitioii of llu' aiitobiograiihic part, Ixitli tlicsc vohmies are, 
for brevity's salfe, rpt'erieil to as ' l{iogi"ai>liy '. 



N D EX 



Abolitionists, condemned by both north 
andsoiitli, ?.'(: Seward differs from, •!.■). 

Adams, John Qiilncy, 2, 3, 4, 13, 31, 33. 

Albany 'regency,' Seward's criticism of, 
8-9. 

American Anti-Slavery Society, 33; in- 
quiries of in 1838, 34. 

Anti-masonic imrtv, orijfin of, 4; collapse 
of, 5. 

Bank of United States, political contest 
relative to, (l-lO; Seward speaks in 
defense of. 10-11, 12: constitutional- 
ity of the removal of deposits from, 
ll-l:?. 

Benton, Thomas H., 43. 

Buchanan, .lames, (U, 75. 

Butler, .\. P.. \i\\es a reason why the 
south wished the Missouri compromise 
annulled, 0^^-06. 

Calhoun, John C, 30, 42, 43, 44, 54. 

Caroline, ease of the, 25. 

Cass, Lewis, 38. 43. 

Chase, Salmon P., 43, 4(i, 50, 55, 57. 

Clay, Henry, 2. 3, 42, 411, 55; declines to j 
be Anti-masonic caiulidate for presi- 
dent, 5; favors recharter of United 
States hank. '.I-IO; criticises removal 
of the deposits, 10, 11; in campaign of 
1844, 3(i, 37; his compromise plan in 
18.50, 43; sjieaks in support of it, 43. 

Clinton, I)e Witt, 1-2, 3. j 

Crawford. William H., 2. 

Crittenden. John J.. 02; his j)roposed 
coniiiromise, ISOO-iil, 7li, 83. 1 

Davis. Jefferson, 43. i 

Dix, John A., 18, 40. j 

Doushis, Stephen A., -ili. 55. 00, 04; his ^ 

doctrine of non-intervention, 53-54. 

Emigrant Aid Society, of New England, j 
59, GO. 

Kield, Cyrus W., 73. 
Fillmore, ]Millar<l, 4, S, 40. 
Foote, Menry S., 40. 
Free-Soil party, origin of, 38. 



Garrison, William Lloyd, 33, 73. 
Ciilmer, Thomas W., 28. 
(i ranger, Francis, 4. 
Gwin, W. M., 74. 

Hale, John P., 42, 50. 

Hughes. Most Rev. John, Archbishop of 

!New York, 22; speaks on the school 

question, 20. 

Jackson. Andrew, 2, 5, 13, 14; his hos- 
tility to United States bank, 9-10. 
Jay, John, 15. 

Kansas, struggle for, 59-C6 ; Topeka 
constitution, 59-00; Lecompton con- 
stitution. 03-04. 

King. Rufus, 2. 

Kossuth, Louis, 52. 

Lincoln, Abraham, 74; corresponds with 
Seward in 1800-01, 83. 

JFcLeod. Alexander, case of, 2.5-27. 
Marcy, William L., 1, 12, 15. 
Maynard, William U., 8. 
Morgan, William, 4. 

National Rejiublicau party, origin of, 3; 

decline of, 0, 14. 
New York, politics of the state of, about 

1834, 1-2; constitutional convention 

of 1831 in. 2. 
Nott, Dr. Eliphalet, 3. 

Phillips. Wendell, 79. 

Pierce, Franklin, 59; defends the terri- 
torial government in Kiinsas, 00. 

Polk. James K., 35. 

Prigg vs. l^ennsylvania, decision in the 
case ot. 30. 

Public School Society, in Nevt^ York 
city, complaints against, 30-21 ; de- 
fense of, 2 1 . 

Rush, Richard, 4. 

Seward, William II., his e<lucation, 3: 
a lawyer, but early interested in poli- 
tics, 3 : reasons for his becoming a 
National Republican, 3; becomes an 



\ 



3 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



88 



INDEX. 



011 895 709 ft 



I 



Anti-mason, 4 ; takes a prominent 
part in organizing the new |)arty, 5; 
is elected state senator, .'i; wliy an 
Anti-mason, r>-ij: his o|)lnioiis at tlie 
time coneernin!; Anti-masonry, ti: liis 
characteristics as a politician, il-": is 
one of tlie Anti-masonic leaders in 
the state senate, 8; writes party docu- 
ments, 8: speaks in favor of election 
of mayor hy the people, ',)■. criticises 
Jackson's removal of the deposits, to- 
ll; opposes a state loan to relieve the 
linancial i)rcssure, 1:!: his theory re- 
gardin.tc railroads. 1:.': argues ai:ainst 
instrnctintr nieniliers of <'oui.'n"ss. \'i: 
approves .lacUson's course touching 
nullilication, lr.'-i:i: not a strict con- 
structicniist, l.T; becomes a Whig, 14- 
15; is dt?teate<l as candidate for gov- 
ernor in IS.'M, 1."): is elect(!d lirstWhig 
governor of New York in is:i8, l.'i; 
advocates internal improvcnu^ids, 10- 
18; favors distril)utiou of jiroceeds of 
public lands, 17; his jiosition in the 
controversy respecting the ]iublic 
scliools, lS-'_';i; his frieniUy attitude to 
the foreign-horn, rj:2-2:t; advocates in- 
struction of convicts, '_'!i; his policy 
respecting patronage. 33-:.'4: his posi- 
tion as regards the McLeod case, :;r>- 
37; his position in the Virginia con- 
troversy, :37-ltl: resumes practice of 
the law in 184H, 3:.'; his self-conlidence. 
32-3.3; his early expressions on tlie 
suiiject of slavery, 34-3.') ; Ins di- 
vergence from tlie abolitionists, 3.5: 
supports Clay in campaign of 1844, 
3(5, 37; opposes anncxatii>i\ of Texas, 
36; his ideas rcspi'Cting the relation 
of the federal constitution to slavery, 
Za, 30-37, 311-40 ; favors the use of 
only constitutional means against 
slavery, 37; supports Taylor in 1848, 
38; disbelieves in the formation of a 
distinct anti-slavery party, 3(1; Ids 
Cleveland speech. 3ii-40; is elected 
United .States senator in 184'.i. 40; con- 
curs with Taylor in his jiolicy as to 
the new territories, 42; his California 
speech in congress, 44-4."i; recejition 
of his announcenunit of a •higlier 
law,' 40-17; weakness of Ids plan to 
admit new stat<is, 47-48: his position 
witli reference to the Wilmot iiroviso, 
48; his bill to abolish slavery in the 
District of Cohnul)ia, 4'.i-r>0 ; dislikes 
the Whig pUitfonu of 18.52, "il ; sug- 
gests propositions to promote emanci- 



jiation, .")2: his idea of national expan- 
sion, ,'i3; speaks against the Ivan^ias- 
Nebraska bill, ."iO-."i7; tavors immedi- 
ate admission of Kansas, 01, fiS; oj)- 
poses the r,ecomptoii |)lau, ()4-05; be- 
comes a licpublican, 07: is talked of 
for the jircsjdciK'y in 18.")0, 07-08; 
oi)])oses co-operation with Ivnow- 
IS'othings, 08; fails of nomination in 
1800, OS : synopsis of his political 
speeches, 18">r)-00, ()8-72; his idea of 
an irrepressible conflict, 00-70 ; Ills 
opinion of the bc;uing of the negro 
question on tiiatof slavi'ry. 71: favors 
an Atlantic cable, 7.''.; favors protec- 
tion, 73; favors a conditional acqui- 
sition of Cuba, 73-74; advocates the 
building of a Pacilic railroiid, 74; his 
position in congress during December, 
18li0, 7r>-71): submits jiropositious to 
committee of tbirtcen. 70-77: speaks 
on secession in New York. 77: favors 
a Pacific railroad system as a means 
of union, 77; his 12th of January 
si)eech, 77-79; its reception, 70; his 
present policy, 7il-S(l: bis change of 
i.ssue, 81; correspomls with Lincoln, 
82; suggests changes in the inaugural, 
83; his chief service to the anti-slavery 
cause, 83. 

Smith. Cicrrit. 3."i. 

.Spencer, .John C, 17, 20. 

Stevens. Tliaddeus, 4. 

Story, Joseph, 30. 

Sumner, Charles, 40, .55; defends Mis- 
souri compromise, .57; his estimate of 
Seward's policy respecting Kansas, 
01-02. 

Taylor, Zachary, 38, 48, 40; his policy 
in regard to California and New 
Mexico. 41-42. 

Tomjikins, naniel D.. 1, 3. 

Tracy, Albert 11,8. 

Van Kuri'H, ^lartin. 1, 2, 5. 7, 0. 
Virginia controversy, 27-31; Calhoun 
on, 30: John Quincy Adams on, 31. 

Wade. ISenjamiu F., .5.5. 

Webster, Daniel, 27, 42, 47, 5.5, 79; his 

7th of March speech, 43. 
Weed. Thurlow, 4, 5, 08. 
Whig party, origin of, 14; is considered 

nnfrienilly to foreigners, 22; in cam- 

l)aigu of i848, :^8. 
Wilmot proviso, 41, 43, 47, 48. 
Wirt, William, 4, 5. 



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HOLLINGER 
pH8.5 

MILL RUN F3-1543 



